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INTRODUCTION
In January 2009, the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) of the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) released a panel report on
China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights.1 The dispute concerned the inadequacy
* Copyright © 2011 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property
Law and Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law
School; Wenlan Scholar Chair Professor, Zhongnan University of Economics and
Law; Visiting Professor, Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies,
University of Strasbourg. The Author is grateful to Lindsey Purdy and Megan
Snyder for excellent research and editorial assistance.
1. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement
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of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (“IPRs”)
in China under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights2 (“TRIPS Agreement”). While both
China and the United States quickly declared victory in this dispute,
the dispute’s outcome was more correctly viewed as a tie between
the two parties.3
Pursuant to the panel report, China amended Article 4 of its
Copyright Law4 and Article 27 of its Regulations on Customs
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights5 (“Customs Regulations”)
in spring 2010. By faithfully implementing the panel’s
recommendations, and by continuing its role as a responsible WTO
citizen, China effectively ended its TRIPS enforcement dispute with
the United States.

of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter TRIPS
Enforcement Panel Report].
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
3. This view was strongly supported by the fact that neither side appealed the
panel report to the Appellate Body. See Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement
Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1676558.
4. Copyright
Law
of
the
People’s
Republic
of
China
(中华人民共和国著作权法) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010), art. 4
[hereinafter Chinese Copyright Law], available at http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6062. Pursuant to this amendment, the first sentence of
Article 4, which the WTO panel found to be inconsistent with the TRIPS
Agreement, was removed. The second sentence, which stated that “[c]opyright
owners, in exercising their copyright, shall not violate the Constitution or laws or
prejudice the public interests,” remained intact and became the first sentence. This
sentence is then followed by a newly added sentence, which stipulates: “The
publication and dissemination of works shall be subject to the administration and
supervision of the state.” See generally Yu, supra note 3 (discussing the 2010
amendment to Article 4 of Chinese Copyright Law).
5. Decision of the State Council on Amendment of the Regulations of the
People’s Republic of China on Customs Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
(promulgated by the St. Council, Mar. 24, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010), translated
at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/counselorsreport/asiareport/201005/2010
0506903349.html (amending Article 24 of the Customs Regulations to stipulate
that “the customs may lawfully auction them after the infringement features have
been eliminated, but for imported goods with counterfeited trademarks, except for
special circumstances, such goods shall not be permitted to be traded only by
clearing off the trademarks” (emphasis added)).
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The dispute is important from the standpoint of WTO
jurisprudence. It represents the first time a WTO panel focused
primarily on the interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS
enforcement provisions.6 In addition to examining in great detail and
depth the obligations under Articles 41, 46, 59, and 61 of the TRIPS
Agreement,7 the panel also briefly explored the implications of
Articles 1.1 and 41.5—key safeguards against demands for
overzealous enforcement of intellectual property rights.8 As
developed countries—notably, the United States, the European
Union, Japan, and Switzerland—continue to demand stronger
international intellectual property enforcement norms through the
highly controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement9
(“ACTA”) and other bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade
agreements, this panel report is likely to have special significance.
To be certain, this panel report involves a bilateral dispute
between China and the United States and therefore has limited value
to third parties in the less developed world, which include both
developing and least developed countries. Nevertheless, because the
dispute involves the two largest economies in the world, it will have
serious ramifications for intellectual property developments in other
WTO members. Indeed, the issues addressed in the dispute were so
important that twelve third parties participated in the panel
proceedings. Out of them, half were developing countries: Argentina,
Brazil, India, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey.10 Except for India and
6. This panel report, however, is not the first one involving a TRIPS provision
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights. In United States—
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, the WTO panel and
subsequently the Appellate Body examined Section 211 of the U.S. Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998 in relation to Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement. See
Panel Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Section 211 Panel Report]; Appellate
Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002).
7. TRIPS Agreement arts. 41, 46, 59, 61.
8. Id. arts. 1.1, 41.5.
9. See Draft Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2417. See generally Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and
Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://http://ssrn.com/abstract=1624813.
10. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 1.6. The other third
parties were Australia, Canada, the European Communities, Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan.
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Turkey, all of these countries either provided a written submission to
or made an oral statement before the WTO panel.11
This article focuses on the implications of this panel report for less
developed countries. Part I recapitulates the key arguments made by
China and the United States as well as the major findings in the
report. Parts II and III then evaluate the report from the standpoint of
less developed countries. Part II, in particular, explores six areas in
which the panel report has enabled less developed countries to score
some important points in the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.
Part III concludes by examining three areas in which the report has
provided some disappointments.

I. CLAIMS
In April 2007, the United States requested consultations with
China concerning the latter’s failure to protect and enforce
intellectual property rights pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement.12 The
complaint focused on four particular issues: (1) the high thresholds
for Chinese criminal procedures and penalties in the intellectual
property area; (2) the failure of the Chinese customs authorities to
properly dispose of infringing goods seized at the border; (3) the
denial of copyright protection to works that have not been authorized
for publication or dissemination within China; and (4) the
unavailability of criminal procedures and penalties in China for
infringing activities that involved either reproduction or distribution,
but not both.
Since the filing of the WTO complaint, consultations between the
two parties resolved the last claim. As a result, the United States
requested the DSB to establish a panel to examine only the three
remaining claims.13 Serving as the panel chair was Adrian Macey, a
New Zealand diplomat who was involved in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)/WTO negotiations during the
11. See id. Annex C.
12. Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1
(Apr. 16, 2007) [hereinafter TRIPS Enforcement Complaint].
13. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China—
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, WT/DS362/7 (Aug. 21, 2007) [hereinafter TRIPS Enforcement Panel
Request].
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Uruguay Round. The other two panelists were Marino Porzio, a
Chilean lawyer who served as WIPO Deputy Director General
during 1980–1987, and the late Sivakant Tiwari, a Singaporean
government attorney who chaired the APEC Intellectual Property
Rights Experts’ Group.14
After some initial delay, the long-awaited report was finally
released in January 2009. As I have provided elsewhere a full
analysis of this report,15 this Part only briefly summarizes the key
claims made by China and the United States as well as the panel’s
major findings. To parallel the claims laid out in the original
complaint, this Part discusses the claims in the same order, even
though the panel report examined them in the reverse order.

A. CRIMINAL THRESHOLDS
The first claim concerned the thresholds for criminal procedures
and penalties. Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement states that
“[m]embers shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be
applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or
copyright piracy on a commercial scale.”16 Because each WTO
member is required to apply criminal procedures and penalties to all
cases involving “wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy
on a commercial scale,” the United States claimed that China had
failed to honor its TRIPS commitments by including in its laws high
thresholds for applying criminal procedures and penalties to
intellectual property infringement.17 In the United States’ view, the
thresholds provided a safe harbor to shelter pirates and counterfeiters
from criminal prosecution.18 China therefore failed to provide
criminal enforcement and remedies as required by Articles 61 and
41.4 of the TRIPS Agreement, respectively.19
In response to the U.S. claims, China pointed out that the country
had in place a unique alternative administrative enforcement system
that “does not have a parallel in most Western systems, including the
14. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 1.5.
15. See generally Yu, supra note 3 (providing a comprehensive analysis of the
WTO panel report).
16. TRIPS Agreement art. 61.
17. Id.; see TRIPS Enforcement Complaint, supra note 12.
18. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.494.
19. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Request, supra note 13, at 3.
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US legal system.”20 Due to limited resources and a vastly different
socio-legal tradition, public security authorities in China handle
serious cases (cases above the thresholds), while administrative
copyright and commerce authorities tackle low-scale infringements
(cases below the thresholds).21 Thus, instead of providing a safe
harbor for intellectual property criminals, Chinese law subjects to
enforcement “infringement on any scale.”22
China further explained to the panel the complexity of its criminal
law and the way the United States had misstated the calculation of its
thresholds. As China noted, although the United States repeatedly
emphasized how counterfeiters in China could avoid criminal
punishment by limiting their inventory to 499 copies (in response to
the 500-copy threshold),23 the thresholds do not operate in such a
simple and rigid fashion. According to China, courts “may take into
account multiple acts of infringement, and not simply the income,
profits, sales or number of copies in a single transaction or at a single
point in time.”24 They may also calculate the thresholds over a
prolonged period of time—say, up to five years.25 In addition, courts
take into account “evidence of collaboration between infringers,”
using concepts such as joint liability, criminal groups, and
accomplices as laid out in the Criminal Law.26 They also “consider
20. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, Annex B–1, ¶ 9.
21. See id. ¶ 7.476.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., id. Annex A–1, ¶ 37 (“[I]f a copyright pirate makes 499
reproductions or a retailer stocks 499 copies in a store, they could not be
prosecuted or convicted under Article 217 of the Criminal Law based on the copy
threshold, because the relevant threshold of 500 copies provided by the April 2007
[Judicial Interpretation] would not be met.”); id. Annex A–2, ¶ 11 (“[T]he Article
217 500-copy threshold excludes acts of commercial scale piracy, as a copyright
pirate that makes 499 reproductions or a retailer that stocks 499 copies in a store
could not be prosecuted or convicted on that basis under Article 217.”); id. Annex
A–4, ¶ 30 (“499 unfinished copies of a video game not yet bearing an infringing
trademark still qualify as evidence of a ‘commercial scale’ operation, just as much
as 499 finished video games bearing such a trademark.”); id. Annex A–6, ¶ 12
(“The reality is that in China, a producer can make 499 copies, or a retailer can sell
499 copies, and escape prosecution thanks to the safe harbor created by the
thresholds for Article 217.”).
24. Id. ¶ 7.461.
25. See id. ¶¶ 7.457, 7.461.
26. Id. ¶ 7.439; see also Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China
(中华人民共和国刑法) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., July 1, 1979, amended Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), arts. 25–27,
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semi-finished or unfinished products . . . [as] evidence of preparation
and attempt.”27
In its report, the panel noted that Article 61 is subject to four
limitations: (1) trademarks and copyrights (as opposed to all forms of
intellectual property rights covered by the TRIPS Agreement); (2)
counterfeiting and piracy (as opposed to mere infringement); (3)
willful acts; and (4) infringements “on a commercial scale.”28 The
key to deciding the first claim concerned the last limitation.
Although the term “commercial scale” was “intentionally vague . . .
and left undefined” in the TRIPS Agreement,29 the panel noted that
the term was adopted out of “a deliberate choice” and therefore
“must be given due interpretative weight.”30
Using the DSB’s customary dictionary approach,31 the panel found
that the term includes both qualitative and quantitative elements.32 As
the panel reasoned: “counterfeiting or piracy ‘on a commercial scale’
refers to counterfeiting or piracy carried on at the magnitude or
extent of typical or usual commercial activity with respect to a given
product in a given market.”33 The term therefore provides “a relative
standard, which will vary when applied to different fact situations.”34
To assess the consistency of China’s criminal thresholds with this
complex definition, the panel looked to specific conditions in
China’s marketplace.35
translated at http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207319.htm (providing
for joint criminal liability and liability for criminal groups and accomplices).
27. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.483.
28. See id. ¶¶ 7.518–7.528.
29. Id. Annex B–1, ¶ 22.
30. Id. ¶ 7.543.
31. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER ARUP, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
KNOWLEDGE AGREEMENTS 95 (2d ed. 2008) (noting the “front-line use of standard
dictionaries”); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 77 (2001) (“[A]ll the seven TRIPS dispute
settlement reports published so far have relied largely on the dictionary
meaning.”); Daniel Gervais, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 549, 552 (2009)
(noting “the ‘dictionary approach’ now common in WTO panel reports”).
32. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.538.
33. Id. ¶ 7.577.
34. Id. ¶ 7.600.
35. See id. ¶ 7.604 (“The parties agree that the standard of ‘a commercial scale’
will vary by product and market and that the conformity of China’s criminal
thresholds with that standard must be assessed by reference to China’s
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Although the United States provided evidence in the form of press
articles and industry and consultant reports,36 the panel found the
evidence insufficient to “demonstrate what constituted ‘a commercial
scale’ in the specific situation of China’s marketplace.”37 As the
panel declared, it did not “ascribe any weight to the evidence in the
press articles . . . . [E]ven if it did, the information that these press
articles contain is inadequate to demonstrate what is typical or usual
in China for the purposes of the relevant treaty obligation.”38
In sum, without determining whether China has satisfied its TRIPS
obligations, the WTO panel found that the United States had failed to
substantiate its claim. China therefore prevailed on what many
commentators and rights holders have considered the most important
claim in the dispute.39

marketplace.”).
36. See id. ¶¶ 7.615–7.616. As the panel stated:
In its rebuttal of China’s assertion regarding the scale of commerce in China, the
United States noted that the “commercial scale” standard was a relative one. It
commented on the Economic Census statistics submitted by China but at the same
time dismissed their relevance as they are aggregate statistics related to undefined
average economic units. It also recalled an earlier assertion that the Chinese market,
including the market for many copyright and trademark-bearing goods, is fragmented
and characterized by a profusion of small manufacturers, middlemen, distributors, and
small outlets at the retail level.
The Panel has reviewed the evidence in support of this assertion. The evidence
comprises a quote from a short article from a US newspaper, the San Francisco
Chronicle, titled “30,000–Store Wholesale Mall Keeps China Competitive” regarding
the number of stores in a particular mall in Yiwu and the physical dimensions of some
stalls; a statistic quoted from an extract from a management consultant report titled
“The 2005 Global Retail Development Index” that the top ten retailers in China hold
less than 2 per cent of the market, and another statistic that the top 100 retailers have
less than 6.4 per cent; and a quote from an article in Time magazine titled “In China,
There’s Priceless, and for Everything Else, There’s Cash” that a shopping mall in
Luohu spans six floors of small stores.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
37. Id. ¶ 7.614.
38. Id. ¶ 7.629.
39. See, e.g., Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon Is Over: The U.S.–China WTO
Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, 118–19 (2008)
(contending that the criminal thresholds claim is “the most significant claim in the
United States’ complaint”); Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog that Barked but Didn’t Bite:
15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 389, 414 (2010) (pointing out that the criminal threshold claim “was
no doubt its most important claim in this dispute”).
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B. DISPOSAL OF INFRINGING GOODS
The second claim concerned the ability of the Chinese customs
authorities to properly dispose of infringing goods seized at the
border. Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
Without prejudice to other rights of action open to the right holder and
subject to the right of the defendant to seek review by a judicial authority,
competent authorities shall have the authority to order the destruction or
disposal of infringing goods in accordance with the principles set out in
Article 46.40

Article 46 states further:
In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial
authorities shall have the authority to order that goods that they have
found to be infringing be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of
outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm
caused to the right holder, or, unless this would be contrary to existing
constitutional requirements, destroyed.41

Taken together, these two provisions require a WTO member to
empower its judicial authorities to order the uncompensated
destruction or disposal of infringing goods seized at the border.
Because these provisions only lay out an empowerment obligation,
as compared to mandating a specific action, the WTO members are
not required to “exercise [the stipulated] authority in a particular
way, unless otherwise specified.”42 Instead, the authorities retain a
high degree of discretion to determine their preferred actions.
In light of this limited obligation, the United States could not
argue that the Chinese customs authorities had failed to destroy
infringing goods seized at the border—the action the U.S.
administration and its supportive rights holders preferred. Instead,
the United States advanced a much weaker, and rather academic,
argument that China introduced a “compulsory scheme” that took
away the authorities’ “scope of authority to order the destruction or
40. TRIPS Agreement art. 59.
41. Id. art. 46.
42. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.238. As the panel
recounted, “[p]revious drafts of the TRIPS Agreement had provided that the
authorities shall ‘provide for’ certain remedies, but this phrasing was changed to
read shall ‘have the authority’, as were a number of other draft provisions.” Id.
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disposal of infringing goods.”43
In particular, the United States argued that Article 27 of the
Chinese Customs Regulations,44 in conjunction with the relevant
implementing measures and a public notice from the customs
authorities, created a “compulsory scheme” that has taken away the
ability of the customs authorities to exercise their discretion.45 This
scheme precluded the authorities from destroying the infringing
goods unless they found it inappropriate to donate the goods to
charities, sell them back to rights holders, or auction them off after
eradicating the infringing features.
In response to the U.S. claims, China pointed out that the sequence
merely expressed “an official preference” for disposition methods.46
Under this flexible arrangement, China claimed, its customs
authorities still had wide discretion to determine whether the stated
criteria had been met. In fact, as the panel observed, there were
“circumstances in which Customs departs from the terms of the
measures.”47 The panel therefore found “the measures . . . not ‘as
mandatory’ as they appear on their face.”48
To the surprise of the United States and many intellectual property
rights holders, the WTO panel began by praising China for providing
“a level of protection higher than the minimum standard required” by
43. Id. ¶ 7.197.
44. Article 27 of the Regulations on Customs Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights provided:
Where the confiscated goods which infringe on intellectual property rights can be used
for the social public welfare undertakings, Customs shall hand such goods over to
relevant public welfare bodies for the use in social public welfare undertakings. Where
the holder of the intellectual property rights intends to buy them, Customs can assign
them to the holder of the intellectual property rights with compensation. Where the
confiscated goods infringing on intellectual property rights cannot be used for social
public welfare undertakings and the holder of the intellectual property rights has no
intention to buy them, Customs can, after eradicating the infringing features, auction
them off according to law. Where the infringing features are impossible to eradicate,
Customs shall destroy the goods.

Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Customs Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 2, 2003,
effective Mar. 1, 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/
text.jsp?file_id=199159.
45. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.197.
46. Id. ¶ 7.329.
47. Id. ¶ 7.348.
48. Id.
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the TRIPS Agreement.49 For example, China has extended border
measures to not only piracy and counterfeiting, but also other forms
of copyright, patent, and trademark infringements.50 Thanks to U.S.
pressure in the early-to-mid-1990s51 and with strong influence from
the European Union,52 these border measures have been further
extended to both imported and exported goods even though Article
59 covers only imported goods.53
With respect to donations and sales to rights holders, the WTO
panel noted that Article 59 “do[es] not indicate that the authority to
order the specified types of remedies must be exclusive.”54 While
donations may help meet public welfare needs and are suitable to
conditions in less developed countries,55 sales to rights holders can be
justified by the fact that some rights holders may want to purchase
unauthorized overruns that are qualitatively identical to the
authorized manufactures.56 The panel even accepted the use of
49. Id. ¶ 7.228.
50. See id. ¶ 7.226 (“It is apparent that the intellectual property right
infringements covered by the Customs measures include not only counterfeit
trademark goods and pirated copyright goods, but certain other infringements of
intellectual property rights, namely other trademark-infringing goods, other
copyright-infringing goods, and patent-infringing goods.”).
51. See Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Annex, § 1[G],
U.S.-China, Feb. 26, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 881, 900–03 (1995) (requiring all customs
offices to intensify border protection for all imports and exports of CDs, LDs, CDROMS, and trademarked goods).
52. See Xue Hong, An Anatomical Study of the United States Versus China at
the World Trade Organisation on Intellectual Property Enforcement, 31 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 292, 298 (2009) (noting that “Chinese Regulations on Customs
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights follows Regulation 1383/2003 on
customs actions against goods suspected of infringing intellectual property
rights”).
53. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.227.
54. Id. ¶ 7.240.
55. See id. ¶ 7.306 (“In one case, Customs donated infringing goods to the Red
Cross that were allocated to people in areas struck by natural disasters such as
typhoons, rainstorms and floods. The goods all infringed trademark rights and
consisted of sport shoes, bags of rice noodles, washing powder, air-cooled chillers
and kerosene heaters.”).
56. See id. Annex B–1, ¶ 38 (“Right-holders may choose to purchase infringing
goods where, for example, these seized goods are determined to be overruns
illicitly produced by a licensed manufacturer, and are therefore identical to the
licensed goods.”). But see id. Annex A–1, ¶ 52 (“[A]nyone who has to pay for
goods that violates his or her own patent, trademark or copyright is harmed in the
amount of the payment.”).
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auctions to dispose of infringing goods. As it explained, because “the
remedies specified in Article 59 are not exhaustive . . . , the fact that
authority to order auction of infringing goods is not required is not in
itself inconsistent with Article 59.”57
Nevertheless, the panel faulted China for the way its customs
authorities auctioned off the seized goods. As clearly stated in
Article 46 of the TRIPS Agreement, the provision that provides the
principles incorporated into Article 59, “[i]n regard to counterfeit
trademark goods, the simple removal of the trademark unlawfully
affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to
permit release of the goods into the channels of commerce.”58
Whether the removal is considered “simple” will depend on whether
“the state of the goods is altered sufficiently to deter further
infringement.”59 The panel did not indicate what exactly needs to be
done to avoid a violation of Article 59. It merely hinted that an
exceptional case may arise when “an innocent importer . . . has been
deceived into buying a shipment of counterfeit goods, . . . has no
means of recourse against the exporter and . . . has no means of
reaffixing counterfeit trademarks to the goods.”60 It also suggested
that “[p]ractical requirements, such as removal of the trademark,
affixation of a charitable endorsement or controls over the use of
goods or distribution methods, may avoid confusion.”61
Although China provided additional measures, such as the
solicitation of comments from rights holders62 and the introduction of
an expertly-determined reserve price,63 those measures, in the panel’s
57. Id. ¶ 7.327.
58. TRIPS Agreement art. 46.
59. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.375.
60. Id. ¶ 7.391.
61. Id. ¶ 7.284.
62. See id. Annex B–1, ¶ 47 (“[R]ight-holders have a legal, formal right to
comment prior to any public auction; this procedure helps Customs to determine
that a good would be inappropriate for public auction, and thereby helps avoid
harm to the right-holders.”); id. Annex B–1, ¶ 53 (“Formal comment . . . allows
right-holders to identify specific concerns—such as any safety threats that the
goods pose, or the presence of proprietary design features that cannot be
removed—and allows Customs to determine that an auction would not be
appropriate.”). But see id. Annex A–2, ¶ 23 (noting that the right to comment “is
not a right to prevent the goods from being auctioned”).
63. See id. ¶ 7.202 (noting that China Customs “uses a reserve price at auction
to ensure that infringers do not have the opportunity to purchase the seized goods
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view, did not “create an effective deterrent to infringement”—a key
objective of Article 46.64 In the end, China lost part of the second
claim, even though the panel upheld as TRIPS-consistent the use of
donations, sales to rights holders, and auctions. The panel also
rejected the U.S. claim that customs actions in China were subject to
“a compulsory sequence of steps” in violation of the TRIPS
Agreement.

C. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR CENSORED WORKS
The final claim in the dispute concerned the first sentence of
Article 4 of the Chinese Copyright Law, which states that “[w]orks
the publication and/or dissemination of which are prohibited by law
shall not be protected by this Law.”65 Under the statute, works can be
banned by “Criminal Law, the Regulations on the Administration of
Publishing Industry, the Regulations on the Administration of
Broadcasting, the Regulations on the Administration of Audiovisual
Products, the Regulations on the Administration of Films, and the
Regulations on the Administration of Telecommunication.”66 Based
on China’s denial of protection to banned works, the United States
claimed that China had failed to offer protection to copyright holders
as required by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”), which was incorporated
by reference into the TRIPS Agreement.67
Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention states:
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected
under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of
origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter
grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this

at an unreasonably low cost and reaffix counterfeit marks”).
64. Id. ¶ 7.373.
65. Id. ¶ 7.1; Chinese Copyright Law, art. 4. In lieu of “and/or,” the
conjunctive “or” was used in the official English translation of the Chinese
Copyright Law. In the WTO panel report, however, the phrase “and/or” was used
in Mutually Agreed Translation No. 11. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra
note 1, ¶ 2.6.
66. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.73.
67. TRIPS Agreement art. 9.1; TRIPS Enforcement Panel Request, supra note
13, at 5.
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Convention.68

Article 5(2) further provides: “The enjoyment and the exercise of
these rights shall not be subject to any formality; such enjoyment and
such exercise shall be independent of the existence of protection in
the country of origin of the work.”69 By denying copyright holders
the immediate and automatic enjoyment of their rights, and by
subjecting copyright to the formalities of a successful conclusion of
content review, the Chinese Copyright Law, in the United States’
view, therefore contravened the Berne Convention.
In addition, the United States raised arguments based on Article
41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, which states: “Members shall ensure
that enforcement procedures . . . are available under their law so as to
permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual
property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious
remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a
deterrent to further infringements.”70 According to the United States,
the Chinese law did not provide any effective action against
infringement of those copyrighted works that had not passed the
content review process or that were awaiting the results of the
review.71
In response to the U.S. claims, China made a number of
counterarguments. First, China claimed that the first sentence of
Article 4 of the Copyright Law was “extremely limited in scope.”72
Like other countries, China bans from publication or dissemination
works that consist entirely of unconstitutional or immoral content.73
Second, China made a bizarre argument concerning the distinction
between “copyright” and “copyright protection.” As China
contended, Article 4 did not remove copyright, but denied the

68. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
5(1), Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 (as revised at Paris, July 24,
1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
69. Id. art. 5(2).
70. TRIPS Agreement art. 41.1; TRIPS Enforcement Panel Request, supra note
13, at 6.
71. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.84.
72. See id. ¶ 7.17.
73. Such a ban also included “reactionary, pornographic, or superstitious
contents.” Id. ¶ 7.54.
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“particularized rights of private copyright enforcement.”74 Authors
therefore would still have “access” to the enforcement process even
if they did not have adequate evidence or a valid right to enforce.75
Third, China insisted that Article 17 of the Berne Convention
recognizes a country’s sovereign right “to permit, to control, or to
prohibit . . . the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work
or production.”76 As China observed, the provision places limitations
on all rights granted to authors under the Berne Convention and
“effectively denies WTO jurisdiction in this area.”77
Finally, China pointed out that public regulations a priori preempt private economic rights. China argued that because the
copyright in banned works was considered a “legal and material
nullity,” enforcement of such a right would be meaningless.78 China
further stated that it “enforces prohibitions on content seriously,
and . . . this removes banned content from the public domain more
securely than would be possible through copyright enforcement.”79
As the ban applies to both copyright holders and potential infringers,
China claims private enforcement is unnecessary.80 In China’s view,
content regulatory measures have already provided “an alternative
form of enforcement against infringement,”81 and therefore meet the
“effective action” obligation under Article 41.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement.82
74. Id. ¶ 7.21.
75. See id. ¶ 7.178 (“China asserts that the enforcement procedures in Chapter
V of the Copyright Law are ‘available’ in the sense that the authors of all works
have ‘access’ to enforcement process irrespective of whether they have adequate
evidence or a valid right to enforce.”).
76. Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 17.
77. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.120.
78. Id. ¶ 7.134; see also id. Annex B–4, ¶ 103 (“When governments exercise
their sovereign power to censor, the exercise of private rights is moot:
unauthorized copying is not permitted. Copyright continues, but enforcement is not
needed: the content is banned.”).
79. Id. ¶ 7.137.
80. Id.
81. Id. ¶ 7.180.
82. See TRIPS Agreement art. 41.1 (“Members shall ensure that enforcement
procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as to permit
effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights
covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further
infringements.”).
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Despite this long list of defenses and counterclaims, the WTO
panel found Article 4 of the Chinese Copyright Law to be
inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. In particular, the panel
rejected China’s distinction between copyright and copyright
protection, pointing out that such a distinction would render
copyright “no more than a phantom right.”83 The panel also noted
that the enforcement procedures under Article 41.1 are “far more
extensive” than mere access to the enforcement process.84 In
addition, the panel noted that, even though China had made a policy
choice to make available other enforcement procedures, such as
content regulatory measures, that particular choice “d[id] not
diminish the member’s obligation under Article 41.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement.”85
While the panel recognized a country’s sovereign right to censor,
it pointed out that “copyright and government censorship address
different rights and interests.”86 In the panel’s view, censorship
regulations cannot eliminate rights that are inherent in a copyrighted
work.87 Nor did China satisfactorily “explain why censorship
interferes with copyright owners’ rights to prevent third parties from
exploiting prohibited works.”88 Although the panel confirmed that its
conclusion would not apply to works never submitted for or awaiting
the results of content review in China, as well as the unedited version
of works for which an edited version has been approved for
distribution,89 it recognized the “uncertainty” created by the potential
83. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.66 (“It is difficult to
conceive that copyright would continue to exist, undisturbed, after the competent
authorities had denied copyright protection to a work on the basis of the nature of
the work and the prohibition in the Copyright Law itself.”).
84. Id. ¶ 7.179.
85. Id. ¶ 7.180.
86. Id. ¶ 7.135.
87. As the panel stated:
A government’s right to permit, to control, or to prohibit the circulation, presentation,
or exhibition of a work may interfere with the exercise of certain rights with respect to
a protected work by the copyright owner or a third party authorized by the copyright
owner. However, there is no reason to suppose that censorship will eliminate those
rights entirely with respect to a particular work.

Id. ¶ 7.132.
88. Id. ¶ 7.133.
89. See id. ¶ 7.103 (basing its conclusion on the fact that that “the United States
has not made a prima facie case with respect to works never submitted for content
review in China, works awaiting the results of content review in China and the
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denial in the absence of a determination by the censorship
authorities.90 The United States therefore won the third claim
decisively.

II. GAINS
As a technical matter, WTO panel reports cover only the disputing
parties and have no clear precedential value.91 Nevertheless, WTO
panels often refer to reports adopted by the Appellate Body or other
WTO panels. WTO panel reports can also influence the ongoing and
future development of international intellectual property treaties,
which are often negotiated or implemented in the shadow of these
reports.92 In addition, the reports may provide the rhetoric and
political momentum needed for the various review processes in the
TRIPS Council, other WTO bodies, and other international
organizations. This Part explores six areas in which the panel report
in China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights has enabled less developed countries to
score some important points in the interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement.

unedited versions of works for which an edited version has been approved for
distribution in China”).
90. Id. ¶ 7.118 (footnote omitted).
91. For a trilogy of articles discussing the unsettled nature of this issue, see
generally Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law
(Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845 (1999); Raj Bhala, The
Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a
Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past:
Towards de Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873 (2001).
92. See J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS
Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public–Private Initiatives to Facilitate
Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 61
(1998) (discussing how less developed countries can treat the TRIPS Agreement
“as a set of default rules to be bargained around”); Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing
Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The
Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 459,
476–77 (2004) (noting that countries can negotiate “in the shadow of” the WTO
dispute settlement process).
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A. MINIMUM STANDARDS
By design, the TRIPS Agreement was established as a minimum
standards agreement.93 Article 1.1 states that “[m]embers may, but
shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive
protection than is required by this Agreement.”94 In its report, the
WTO panel acknowledged this treaty design. By mentioning the term
“minimum standard” or its plural form fourteen times, the panel
underscored its importance to understanding the TRIPS Agreement.
In so doing, the panel report recognizes the flexibilities retained in
the TRIPS Agreement and explicitly affirmed in paragraph 5 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.95 The
report also underscores the autonomy and policy space reserved for
less developed countries during the TRIPS negotiations. Such
emphases are important in light of the increasing push by developed
countries for TRIPS-plus protection through the negotiation of the
highly controversial ACTA and other bilateral, plurilateral, and
regional trade agreements.96
93. See generally J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29
INT’L LAW. 345 (1995) (discussing how the TRIPS Agreement established
universal minimum standards in the intellectual property area).
94. TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1.
95. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health of 14 November 2001, ¶ 5, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 746
(2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. Paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration
specifically recognizes the following flexibilities:
a. In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each
provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose
of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.
b. Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.
c. Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises,
including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can
represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.
d. The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to establish its
own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national
treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.

Id.
96. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International
Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392–400 (2004)
(discussing the growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to create
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More importantly, reserving autonomy for member states is a
longstanding tradition in the international intellectual property arena.
Article 19 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, for example, states that countries “reserve the right to make
separately between themselves special agreements for the protection
of industrial property, in so far as these agreements do not
contravene the provisions of this Convention.”97 Similarly, Article 20
of the Berne Convention allows countries to enter into special
agreements “in so far as such agreements grant to authors more
extensive rights than those granted by the Convention, or contain
other provisions not contrary to this Convention.”98 Article 19 states
further that “[t]he provisions of [the Berne] Convention shall not
preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of any greater
protection which may be granted by legislation in a country of the
Union.”99
In light of this longstanding pro-autonomy tradition, the WTO
panel deserves considerable praise for meticulously discerning
China’s minimum obligations in the criminal enforcement area. In its
first written submission, China argued that the United States should
have a higher burden in substantiating its criminal thresholds claim
before the DSB.100 As China stated, “the Panel should treat sovereign
TRIPS-plus obligations); Yu, supra note 9 (discussing the use of ACTA to impose
TRIPS-plus obligations on other WTO members).
97. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 19, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967).
98. Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 20. The WIPO Internet Treaties
provide a good example of these special agreements. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105–17, at 1 (1997); WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105–
17, at 18 (1997).
99. Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 19.
100. As China explained:
In this particular instance . . . the United States bears a significantly higher burden than
it would normally encounter. That is because the United States is advancing a claim—
that Members of TRIPS must enact criminal laws that meet highly specific
international standards—that cuts decisively against the tradition and norms of
international law.
International organizations accord great deference to national authorities in
criminal law matters. A review of international law shows that states have traditionally
regarded criminal law as the exclusive domain of sovereign jurisdiction; where
sovereign governments are subject to international commitments concerning criminal
law, these commitments afford significant discretion to governments regarding
implementation; and international courts have been exceedingly reluctant to impose
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jurisdiction over police powers as a powerful default norm, departure
from which can be authorized only in light of explicit and
unequivocal consent of State parties.”101 Although China later backed
away from such a strong sovereignty-based position and asserted
instead the “well-accepted interpretive canon in dubio mitius,”102 the
panel took note of China’s position and openly “acknowledge[d] the
sensitive nature of criminal matters and attendant concerns regarding
sovereignty.”103 The panel also recognized that “differences among
Members’ respective legal systems and practices tend to be more
important in the area of enforcement.”104
Although the panel report emphasizes the importance of minimum
standards, it is worth noting that the TRIPS Agreement includes
more than just minimum standards. The Agreement also includes
some maximum standards, as well as many built-in flexibilities which
further facilitate the development of additional maximum standards
in local laws. For example, Article 9.2 denies protection to “ideas,
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as
such.”105 Article 27.3(b) also allows for the exclusion of diagnostic,
therapeutic, and surgical methods and plants and animals other than

specific criminal standards on states.
In light of prevailing international law, the United States must not merely show
that its proposed interpretation of the TRIPS Article 61 obligation is correct by
ordinary standards. It must also persuade this panel that the parties to TRIPS agreed to
an obligation to reform their criminal laws of such specificity that it is a sharp
departure from the practice of every country in every other international forum that
relates to national criminal laws.

TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, Annex B–1, ¶¶ 11–13.
101. Id. ¶ 7.497.
102. Id. Annex B–3, ¶ 4. As China elaborated:
This canon holds that when a treaty standard is vague or ambiguous the Panel should
choose the interpretation that imposes the least imposition on a country’s sovereignty.
The Panel should choose a more intrusive interpretation only where there is clear and
specific evidence that a more intrusive interpretation was meant. The logic behind this
canon is that countries should not be assumed lightly to concede sovereignty. The
Panel accordingly must find specific support for an interpretation that does involve an
intrusive concession of sovereignty. . . . The international criminal law cited in China’s
first written submission makes clear that this canon has particular justification in the
realm of criminal law.

Id. ¶¶ 4–6.
103. Id. ¶ 7.501.
104. Id. ¶ 7.513.
105. TRIPS Agreement art. 9.2.
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micro-organisms from patent protection.106
Given the existence of these maximum standards, it is no surprise
that a growing number of commentators have now argued for the
development of more and greater maximum standards in the
international intellectual property regime.107 Such an approach is
largely consistent with the position taken by the WTO panel in the
present report. While the report emphasizes minimum standards, it
does not foreclose any future opportunity for strengthening
maximum standards in the TRIPS Agreement.

B. PRIVATE RIGHTS
The fourth recital of the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement
explicitly recognizes that “intellectual property rights are private
rights.”108 As a senior member of the WTO Secretariat recalled, “the
reference to ‘private rights’ was included at the insistence of the
Hong Kong delegation, which wanted clarification that the
enforcement of IPRs is the responsibility of private rights holders,
and not of governments.”109 With a population of about 7 million
people and the size of New York City, this customs territory was
understandably concerned about the extra resources the government
needed to provide for prosecuting infringements of intellectual
106. Id. art. 27.3(b).
107. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 369, 402 (2006) (“[T]he international intellectual property regime, to some
extent, is handicapped by its lack of maximum standards.”); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 27
(2004) (“[T]he WTO system must begin to recognize substantive maxima on the
scope of available protection . . . .”); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The
TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 58–59 (2004) (discussing how less developed
countries can use a strategy of “regime shifting” to develop counter regime norms
that set up maximum standards of intellectual property protection); Laurence R.
Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5
MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 58 (2003) (noting the need to articulate “maximum
standards of intellectual property protection” because “[t]reaties from Berne to
Paris to TRIPS are all concerned with articulating ‘minimum standards’”); Ruth
Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
75, 168 (2000) (proposing to develop an international fair use doctrine as a
“ceiling”).
108. TRIPS Agreement pmbl.
109. UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 11
n.21 (2005).
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property rights—be they civil or criminal. Moreover, at that early
stage of the TRIPS negotiations, the delegates had finalized neither
Article 61, which mandates criminal enforcement,110 nor Article 58,
which provides for optional ex officio actions.111
Although the TRIPS preamble “draws heavily upon the two
Ministerial Declarations which preceded the Brussels meeting, i.e.
the Punta del Este declaration which launched the Round and the
Mid-term Review Decision of April 1989,”112 this part of the
preamble “was added towards the end of the negotiations.”113 As
Carlos Correa observed:
It is unclear why the negotiating parties included in the Preamble a
statement about the ‘private’ nature of covered IPRs. One possible reason
is that the TRIPS Agreement uncomfortably fits within the WTO
framework, as it is the only multilateral agreement that deals directly with
rights of private parties rather than with governmental measures. Another
possible reason is the desire to make clear that Members were not obliged
to take action ex officio, and that title-holders should bear the burden of
exercising and defending their rights.114

The preamble’s emphasis on the private nature of intellectual
property rights is important, because Article 31.2 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) states
clearly that “[t]he context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise . . . its preamble and annexes.”115 Indeed,
commentators have generally considered the preamble “an integral
part of the agreement, a condensed expression of its underlying
principles.”116 It is therefore understandable that the panel gave the
110. TRIPS Agreement art. 61.
111. Id. art. 58; see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 487 (3d ed. 2008) (“Article 58 is . . . a ‘may’
provision . . . . Its purpose is not to impose ex officio measures . . . but to dictate a
framework for such measures where they exist and indicate that framework
complies with TRIPS obligations.”).
112. GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 155.
113. Id. at 156.
114. CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 10 (2007).
115. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.2, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (emphasis added).
116. GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 154–55; see also CORREA, supra note 114, at
17 (“The text of the preamble is an important source of interpretation to clarify the
meaning of treaty provisions. In fact, owing to the controversial nature of the

2011]

TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

749

preamble due interpretative weight.
In interpreting Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement, for example,
the present panel report makes clear that “the phrase ‘shall have the
authority’ does not require Members to take any action in the
absence of an application or request.”117 The panel recalled the
preambular language in the TRIPS Agreement, which emphasizes
the private nature of intellectual property rights.118 The panel further
noted the use of words such as “applicant” and “request” in various
enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.119 Thus, unlike the
heightened international intellectual property enforcement standards
that developed countries are now pushing globally through ACTA
and other bilateral, plurilateral, or regional trade agreements, the
TRIPS Agreement—which codified internationally recognized
minimum standards in the early 1990s120—did not require the
issues covered by the TRIPS Agreement, many of its provisions are ambiguous or
deliberately leave Members room for interpretation. The ‘context’ provided by the
preamble becomes, hence, particularly relevant in this case.”); UNCTAD-ICTSD,
supra note 109, at 2 (“Government officials and judges may use the preamble of a
treaty as a source of interpretative guidance in the process of implementation and
dispute settlement.”).
117. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.247.
118. See id. ¶ 7.530; see also Li Xuan, Ten General Misconceptions About the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 14, 27 (Li Xuan & Carlos M.
Correa eds., 2009) (“As with any other kind of private rights, the enforcement of
IP rights is primarily a matter concerning individual owners of these rights. It is the
primary obligation of right-holders and not governments to enforce their claimed
rights and take necessary legal actions for protecting their own IPR.”).
119. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.247 (“The
Panel . . . observes that a common feature of Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Part III of the
TRIPS Agreement is that the initiation of procedures under these Sections is
generally the responsibility of private rights holders. This is reflected in the first
sentence of Article 42 and the first sentence of Article 51, the reference to an
‘applicant’ in Article 50.3 and 50.5, the reference to ‘request[s]’ in Articles 46 and
48.1, and the option (not obligation) to make ex officio action available under
Article 58.”).
120. See Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History
and Impact on Economic Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 23, 43 (Peter
K. Yu ed., 2007) (“TRIPS adjusted the level of intellectual property protection to
what was the highest common denominator among major industrialized countries
as of 1991.”); see also id. at 29 (“The 1992 text was not extensively modified and
became the basis for the TRIPS Agreement adopted at Marrakesh on April 15,
1994.”).
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provision of ex officio authority to seize allegedly infringing
goods.121 Indeed, Article 58 of the TRIPS Agreement, which
specifically deals with the situation where domestic laws provide for
ex officio actions, was included only as a “may” provision.122
The panel’s emphasis on intellectual property rights as private
rights is particularly timely, in light of the developed countries’
recent demands for greater criminal enforcement, ex officio authority,
and data exclusivity on the part of regulatory authorities. Such
demands have gradually shifted the costs and responsibilities from
private rights holders to national governments.123 From the
standpoint of less developed countries, this shift is highly undesirable
because stronger enforcement often comes with a hefty price tag and
difficult trade-offs.124 Given the limited resources in many less
developed countries, an increased use of resources in the
121. See GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 156 (noting that the fourth paragraph of
the TRIPS preamble was added “to reaffirm that states are not, as a general rule,
obliged to take action ex officio against violations of intellectual property rights
(though the Agreement makes clear that in certain cases such actions must be
available—see in particular art. 58 but also 22(3) and 23(2))”).
122. See id. 487 (noting that the purpose of Article 58 “is not to impose ex
officio measures . . . but to dictate a framework for such measures where they exist
and indicate that framework complies with TRIPS obligations”).
123. As Professor Correa noted:
Criminalization is regarded by its proponents as a stronger deterrent than civil
remedies. For right holders there are some significant advantages: actions can or must
be initiated ex officio and the cost of procedures is fully borne by the states. However,
it is clear that IPRs are private rights and that states’ only obligation under the TRIPS
Agreement is to ensure that enforcement procedures are available, and not to enforce
IPRs themselves on its own cost and responsibility.

Carlos M. Correa, The Push for Stronger Enforcement Rules: Implications for
Developing Countries, in ICTSD, THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27, 42 (2009)
(footnote omitted), available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/03/fink-correaweb.pdf; see also Li, supra note 118, at 28 (“[R]esponsibility of enforcement has
cost implications. . . . [B]y shifting responsibility, it would shift the cost of
enforcement from private parties to the government and ensure right-holders are
beneficiaries without asking responsibility.”); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Redelineation of the Role of Stakeholders: IP Enforcement Beyond Exclusive Rights,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 118 at 43, 51–52 (noting the trend of “externalizing the risks and
resources to enforce IP rights away from the originally responsible rights-holders
towards state authorities”).
124. See generally Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2
WIPO J. 1 (2010).
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enforcement area inevitably will lead to the withdrawal of resources
from other competing, and at times more important, public needs.
Such needs include purification of water, generation of power,
improvement on public health, reduction of child mortality, provision
of education, promotion of public security, building of basic
infrastructure, reduction of violent crimes, relief of poverty,
elimination of hunger, promotion of gender equality, protection of
the environment, and responses to terrorism, illegal arms sales,
human and drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and corruption.125
125. See, e.g., Correa, supra note 123, at 43 (“[I]n developing countries that
suffer from high levels of street crime and other forms of criminality that put at
risk the life, integrity, or freedom of persons on a daily basis, it seems reasonable
that fighting such crimes should receive higher priority than IP-related crimes
where protected interests are essentially of a commercial nature (except when
associated with adulteration of health and other risky products).”); Carsten Fink,
Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Perspective, in THE GLOBAL
DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 123, at xiii, 2 (“Governments need to make
choices about how many resources to spend on combating piracy, as opposed to
enforcing other areas of law, building roads and bridges, protecting national
security, and providing other public goods. Such choices are usually not stated in
explicit terms, but they underlie every budgetary decision by federal and local
governments.”); Li Xuan & Carlos M. Correa, Towards a Development Approach
on IP Enforcement: Conclusions and Strategic Recommendations, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 118 at 207, 210 (noting that the demands for strengthened intellectual
property enforcement “seem to overlook the cost of the required actions, the
different priorities that exist in developing countries regarding the use of public
funds (health and education would normally be regarded as more urgent than IP
enforcement) and the crucial fact that IPRs are private rights and, hence, the
burden and cost of their enforcement is to be borne by the right-holder, not the
public at large”); Xue Hong, Enforcement for Development: Why Not an Agenda
for the Developing World, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 118 at 133, 143 (“Increment and
strength of public enforcement measures will inevitably impose an economic
burden on the developing countries and divert the priorities of these countries, such
as prosecution of violent crimes or relief of poverty.”); Frederick M. Abbott &
Carlos M. Correa, World Trade Organization Accession Agreements: Intellectual
Property Issues 31 (Quaker United Nations Office, Global Economic Issues Paper
No. 6, 2007), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/
WTO-IP-English.pdf (“For many developing countries, protection of IPR is not,
nor should it be, a national priority. Financial resources are better invested in
public infrastructure projects, such as water purification and power generation.”);
Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng & Viviana Munoz Tellez, The Changing Structure and
Governance of Intellectual Property Enforcement 4 (South Centre, Research Paper
No. 15, 2008), available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_
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More problematically, this shift of responsibility may ultimately
backfire on those countries that seek to use intellectual property
protection to attract foreign investment. For instance, strengthening
border control requires the development of specialized expertise and
sophistication on the part of customs authorities. If these authorities
fail to develop the requisite expertise and sophistication, their
inconsistent—and at times wrongful—application of new, and
usually tougher, border measures may lead to uncertainty and
concerns that eventually frighten away foreign investors.126 Even
worse, the irregularities in applying these measures may become the
subject of complaints firms register with their governments. These
complaints, in turn, may lead to greater pressure from foreign
governments—for example, through the notorious Section 301
process in the United States.127
In the end, what started as a country’s attempt to attract foreign
investment and promote economic development ends up being a
heavy burden on its already resource-deficient balance sheet. It is no
wonder that the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights
docman&task=doc_download&gid=714&Itemid=&lang=en (“Police raids and the
use of criminal law enforcement mechanisms . . . require extensive use of public
funds and in developing countries may entail pulling resources away from other
law enforcement efforts when there are other means, particularly via civil law, that
may be strengthened to allow private parties to enforce their rights and which do
not require extensive use of public funds.”); Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward
Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play 9
(IQsensato, Occasional Papers No. 1, 2008), available at http://www.iq
sensato.org/wp-content/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_
June_2008.pdf (“The opportunity costs of switching scarce resources for border
enforcement of IP ‘crimes’ is huge. There surely are more pressing problems for
law enforcement in developing countries than ensuring profits for OECD-based
firms.”); Robin Gross, ACTA’s Misguided Effort to Increase Govt Spying and
Ratchet-Up IPR Enforcement at Public Expense, IP JUST. (Mar. 21, 2008),
http://ipjustice.org/wp/2008/03/21/acta-ipj-comments-ustr-2008march/
(“The
financial expense to tax-payers to fund ACTA would be enormous and steal scarce
resources away from programs that deal with genuine public needs like providing
education and eliminating hunger. ACTA would burden the judicial system and
divert badly needed law enforcement and customs resources away from public
security and towards private profit.”).
126. See Ruse-Khan, supra note 123, at 52 (“[E]x-officio actions . . . not only
shift the initiative and costs for taking action to the state but also entail significant
risks of damaging claims by affected importers whenever the goods suspended in
the end are not IP infringing.”).
127. See Yu, supra note 9, at 73–74.
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recommended against this particular trend:
[A]s state enforcement of IPRs is a resource-intensive activity, there is a
strong case for developing countries to adopt IPR legislation that
emphasises enforcement through a civil rather than a criminal justice
system. . . . [W]e note that developing countries have come under
pressure from industry which advocates enforcement regimes based on
state initiatives for the prosecution of infringements. Such pressures
should be resisted, and right owners assume the initiative and costs of
enforcing their private rights.128

It is important to remember that, although increased enforcement
standards pose more considerable challenges to less developed
countries as a result of their acute capacity and resource constraints,
similar constraints affect developed countries, though to a lesser
degree. In the United States, for example, Tim Trainer, the former
president of the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, lamented
how “the staff dedicated solely to IPR enforcement [in the U.S.
government] could be counted on two hands.”129 Likewise, Chris
Israel, the former U.S. International IPR Enforcement Coordinator,
testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission that “[w]ith finite resources and seemingly infinite
concerns, how [the United States] focus[es its] efforts is crucial.”130
In the same public hearing, a former associate commissioner of the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration also noted his administration’s
need to focus on getting “the best bang for the regulatory dollar . . .
[and going] after the big time criminals.”131 Even Tim Philips, a
128. COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 147 (2002) [hereinafter IPR COMMISSION
REPORT], available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/
CIPRfullfinal.pdf.
129. Timothy P. Trainer, Intellectual Property Enforcement: A Reality Gap
(Insufficient Assistance, Ineffective Implementation)?, 8 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 47, 58 (2008).
130. Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods:
Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, 109th Cong. 9
(2006) (written testimony of Chris Israel, International IPR Enforcement
Coordinator, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce).
131. Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods:
Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, 109th Cong. 183
(2006) (oral testimony of Peter Pitts, President, Center for Medicine in the Public
Interest, New York).
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staunch advocate of tough intellectual property enforcement,
acknowledged the impossibility for the New York Police Department
“to raid all the warehouses all of the time without swallowing the
entire NYPD anti-counterfeiting budget and taking officers off other
duties.”132 If developed countries face significant challenges in
providing the resources needed to strengthen intellectual property
enforcement, it is understandable why their less developed
counterparts are deeply concerned about the growing demands for
resources needed to meet high international intellectual property
enforcement standards.

C. SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE
Article 31.3 of the Vienna Convention states that “there shall be
taken into account, together with the context . . . any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions.”133 Drawing on this
provision, China advanced the United States–Australia Free Trade
Agreement as an indication of how the TRIPS delegates at the time
of the negotiations had not yet adopted the U.S.-proposed definition
of “commercial scale.”134 The panel, however, declined to treat such
an agreement as a subsequent agreement within the meaning of the
Vienna Convention.135 After all, U.S. free trade agreements are
negotiated on a bilateral or plurilateral basis, and China is not a party
132. TIM PHILLIPS, KNOCKOFF: THE DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS 36
(2005).
133. Vienna Convention, supra note 115, art. 31.3.
134. For example, the United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement states:
Wilful copyright piracy on a commercial scale includes:
(i) significant wilful infringements of copyright, that have no direct or indirect
motivation of financial gain; and
(ii) wilful infringements for the purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain.

United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.1.26(a), May
18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919. As China explained:
There would be no reason to negotiate this definition with countries that already are
subject to the TRIPS obligations, if the terms already had this meaning in TRIPS. On
the contrary, the US insistence on developing a stricter definition in the bilateral
context underscores that “commercial scale” as set forth in TRIPS is a broad concept
that permits considerable national discretion. It is an acknowledgement that the United
States failed to secure in the TRIPS Article 61 negotiations the obligation that it
nonetheless seeks to impose here.

TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, Annex B–1, ¶ 25.
135. See id. ¶ 7.581.

2011]

TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

755

to any these agreements. Notwithstanding the panel’s rejection of
China’s attempt to introduce a post-TRIPS bilateral trade agreement
as evidence, the final outcome actually benefited not only China, but
also other less developed countries.
As the panel reasoned, the definition of “commercial scale”
adopted by the negotiators in the TRIPS Agreement may be
somewhat different from what the United States proposed (and
adopted in its free trade agreements). For example, the panel
reminded the United States that the country, “[i]n response to a
question from the Panel, . . . confirmed that its own Copyright Law
was only amended in 1997 to deal with the problem of massive
infringement, such as via the Internet, even if the infringing activity
is not necessarily pursued for financial gain.”136 The panel also
“emphasize[d] that its findings should not be taken to indicate any
view as to whether the obligation in the first sentence of Article 61 of
the TRIPS Agreement applies to acts of counterfeiting and piracy
committed without any purpose of financial gain.”137 To some extent,
the panel concurred with China’s position (and that of other less
developed countries) that, under the TRIPS Agreement, “criminal
enforcement is required if the infringing activity is on a commercial
scale, not if the impact of the infringing activity is on a commercial
scale.”138
Moreover, by rejecting the recently-negotiated bilateral,
plurilateral, and regional trade agreements as subsequent agreements
within the meaning of the Vienna Convention, the panel successfully
preserved the balance of rights and obligations in the TRIPS
Agreement. One of the main concerns among less developed
countries is the spillover effects of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional
trade agreements on commitments they obtained through the TRIPS
negotiations.139 By recognizing that these newly-negotiated

136. Id. ¶ 7.660; see No Electronic Theft (Net) Act, Pub. L. No. 105–147, 111
Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.) (amending the U.S. Copyright Act to extend criminal liability for
copyright infringement to individuals who have not made any monetary profit
through their infringing activities).
137. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.662.
138. Id. Annex B–1, ¶ 33 (emphasis added).
139. See generally Yu, supra note 96, at 392–400 (discussing the growing use of
bilateral and regional trade agreements to create TRIPS-plus obligations).
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agreements do not enter the WTO framework through the backdoor,
the panel alleviated some of the concerns over the use of these
agreements to circumvent the multilateral process.
Finally, the panel left open the door for less developed countries to
challenge the inconsistency of these agreements with the TRIPS
Agreement. The second sentence of Article 1.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement stipulates that “[m]embers may, but shall not be obliged
to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required
by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene
the provisions of this Agreement.”140 Some member states,
policymakers, and commentators therefore correctly read this
provision as a ceiling that requires members not to implement more
extensive protection than the Agreement requires if such additional
protection would contravene the Agreement.141 As the Indian
delegation recently noted in its intervention at the TRIPS Council:
Although TRIPS Agreement is usually considered to be a minimum levels
agreement, enforcement levels cannot be raised to the extent that they
contravene TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS plus measures cannot be justified
on the basis of Art 1:1 since the same provision also states that more
extensive protection may only be granted “provided that such protection
does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement”.
In addition to laying certain minimum standards, TRIPS Agreement
also provides ‘ceilings’, some of which are mandatory and clearly
specified in the TRIPS Agreement. Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement has
achieved a very careful balance of the interests of the right holders on the
one hand, and societal interests, including development-oriented concerns
on the other. Enforcement measures cannot be viewed in isolation of the
Objectives contained in Art 7 . . . .142

The position India took makes good sense. After all, “higher levels
140. TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1.
141. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to
International Trade? ACTA Border Measures and Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 644, 653–57 (2011).
142. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights [TRIPS
Council], Communication from India, Intervention on TRIPS plus Enforcement
Trends (June 9, 2010), reprinted in Why “IPR Enforcement” in ACTA & FTAs
Harm the South, S. BULL., July 28, 2010, at 10–11; see also TRIPS Council,
Minutes of June 8–9, 2010 Meeting, ¶ 265, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel6_e.htm (providing the official
minutes of the TRIPS Council meeting).

2011]

TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

757

of IPR protection may create barriers to legitimate trade”—a key
concern of both the WTO and its TRIPS Agreement.143
As far as the interpretation of Article 1.1 is concerned, its
negotiation history should not be ignored. As Daniel Gervais
recounted, “earlier drafts, including that of Japan and informal drafts
in circulation before the Brussels meeting, stated unambiguously that
the Agreement contained ‘minimum obligations.’”144 The drafts
submitted by the European Communities and the United States, for
example, used the negative language “nothing shall prevent
PARTIES from [implementing TRIPs-plus measures] . . . .”145 The
current language, however, states that “Members may, but shall not
be obliged to” implement such measures.146 To some extent, the
present language reflects the rare gains less developed countries
made during the TRIPS negotiations.147 As Professor Correa
emphatically declared: “[I]n language that seems to address
developing countries’ concerns, [the TRIPS Agreement] explicitly
states that no Member can be ‘obliged’ to implement in its national
law ‘more extensive protection than is required by this
Agreement.’”148

D. LOCAL CONDITIONS
Article 61 includes an undefined, ambiguous term “commercial
scale.”149 To give meaning to this term, the present panel used the
dictionary approach to indicate that the term has both qualitative and
quantitative elements.150 While the panel could have adopted a
143. CORREA, supra note 114, at 25.
144. GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 164.
145. Id.
146. TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1.
147. See GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 164 (“[I]t could be said that para.1
indirectly emphasises the fact that the Agreement did not achieve all that some
countries wished.”).
148. CORREA, supra note 114, at 24 (citing TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1).
149. TRIPS Agreement art. 61.
150. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.538. As the panel
elaborated:
[T]he combination of that definition of “commercial” with the definition of “scale”
presents a problem in that scale is a quantitative concept whilst commercial is
qualitative, in the sense that it refers to the nature of certain acts. Some acts are in fact
commercial, whilst others are not. Any act of selling can be described as commercial
in this primary sense, irrespective of its size or value. If “commercial” is simply read
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universal definition of “commercial scale” that mirrors the TRIPS
Agreement’s one-size-fits-all approach, it wisely decided otherwise.
Instead, the panel report states that the term “commercial scale”
provides “a relative standard, which will vary when applied to
different fact situations.”151 Because “counterfeiting or piracy ‘on a
commercial scale’ refers to counterfeiting or piracy carried on at the
magnitude or extent of typical or usual commercial activity with
respect to a given product in a given market,”152 the panel had to look
to specific conditions in China’s marketplace to determine whether
its criminal thresholds have violated the TRIPS Agreement.153
While the panel’s willingness to appreciate local conditions is
highly welcome, it also signals some challenges for future
complainants. In the present dispute, for example, the market
conditions are highly complex. The Chinese market is notoriously
“fragmented and characterized by a profusion of small
manufacturers, middlemen, distributors, and small outlets at the retail
level.”154 As the United States elaborated in its first written
as a qualitative term, referring to all acts pertaining to, or bearing on commerce, this
would read the word “scale” out of the text. Acts on a commercial scale would simply
be commercial acts. The phrase “on a commercial scale” would simply mean
“commercial”. Such an interpretation fails to give meaning to all the terms used in the
treaty and is inconsistent with the rule of effective treaty interpretation.
There are no other uses of the word “scale” in the TRIPS Agreement, besides the
first and fourth sentences of Article 61. However, the wider context shows that the
TRIPS Agreement frequently uses the word “commercial” with many other nouns,
although nowhere else with “scale”. The other uses of the word “commercial” include
“commercial rental”, “commercial purposes”, “commercial exploitation”, “commercial
terms”, “public non-commercial use”, “first commercial exploitation”, “honest
commercial practices”, “commercial value”, “unfair commercial use”, “noncommercial nature” and “legitimate commercial interests”.

Id. ¶¶ 7.538–7.539 (footnotes omitted).
151. Id. ¶ 7.600.
152. Id. ¶ 7.577.
153. See id. ¶ 7.604 (“The parties agree that the standard of ‘a commercial scale’
will vary by product and market and that the conformity of China’s criminal
thresholds with that standard must be assessed by reference to China’s
marketplace.”).
154. Id. ¶ 7.615; see also Responses by the United States of America to the
Questions by the Panel to the Parties, China—Measures Affecting the Protection
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 41 n.20, WT/DS362/1 (May 5,
2007) (“Although the Chinese retail market is huge, it is extremely fragmented,
with no dominant organized players. The top 10 retailers hold less than 2 percent
of the market, and the top 100 retailers have less than 6.4 percent.” (quoting A.T.
KEARNEY, THE 2005 GLOBAL RETAIL DEVELOPMENT INDEX: DESTINATION CHINA
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submission:
[A] single wholesale mall in Yiwu, China houses some 30,000 stores,
many of them in small 10-by-15 foot stalls. Retail establishments come in
many different sizes and are widely dispersed across China. Another
shopping mall in Luohu Commercial City spans six floors of small stores
and offers “counterfeit goods at bargain prices.” In spite of the recent
growth of large retailers in China, much retail commerce appears to still
be conducted through small outlets, and consequently beyond the reach of
criminal sanctions due to the criminal thresholds.155

To some extent, one could wonder whether the TRIPS delegates
anticipated this type of highly fragmented markets when they
negotiated the specific language in Article 61.
Notwithstanding the challenge in collecting information about
market conditions, the present panel insisted on obtaining
authoritative information specific to the local markets, such as
information on pricing and market structures.156 The panel’s
requirements of this type of evidence not only benefit less developed
countries in the WTO process, but also provide a major boost to the
growing demands for empirical studies or impact assessments on the
push for greater intellectual property protection and enforcement.
After all, international organizations, policymakers, and
commentators have already widely endorsed such assessments in the
areas of human rights, public health, and biological diversity.157
(2005), available at http://www.atkearney.com/index.php/ Publications/the-2005global-retail-development-index-destination-china.html)).
155. First Submission of the United States of America, China—Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 122,
WT/DS362/1 (Jan. 30, 2008) (footnote omitted).
156. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.629 (stating that
the information contained in the press articles submitted by the United States was
“inadequate to demonstrate what is typical or usual in China for the purposes of the
relevant treaty obligation”); id. ¶ 7.630 (“[I]t can be noted that more specific
information on prices and markets in China is contained in various US exhibits,
notably information on prices of products in a report on Cinema and Home
Entertainment in China prepared by Screen Digest and Nielsen NRG . . . and in
annexes to a letter from Nintendo of America to the United States Trade
Representative.” (footnote omitted)).
157. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity art. 14(1)(a), June 5, 1992,
1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (requiring contracting parties to “introduce appropriate
procedures requiring environmental impact assessment of its proposed projects that
are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity with a view to
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Moreover, the panel’s push for an evidence-based approach is
highly important from the standpoint of future development of
internationally recognized intellectual property standards. As the
U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights reminded us, the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights is “a means
to an end, not an end in itself.”158 These rights, therefore, should not
be developed based on a mere leap of faith. By focusing on the need
to appreciate local conditions and by taking an evidence-based
approach, the panel report helps slow down the ongoing push for
one-size-fits-all—or more precisely, super-size-fits-all—standards
through the TRIPS Agreement and other international instruments. It
also reflects the fact that intellectual property rights, though an
important policy tool, form only part of a larger innovation system.

E. SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE
Relating to the previous point, and even better from the standpoint
of less developed countries, the present panel demanded substantive,
as opposed to anecdotal, evidence. As mentioned earlier, the panel
report rejects the use of allegations in nonauthoritative press articles
or highly aggregated data in consultant and industry reports.159 The
panel’s demand for substantive evidence is not limited to the United
States. It is consistent throughout the panel proceedings.
With respect to the first claim on censorship, for example, the

avoiding or minimizing such effects and, where appropriate, allow for public
participation in such procedures”); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ.,
Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to
Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any
Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He Is the Author (Article 15,
Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006)
(“States parties should . . . consider undertaking human rights impact assessments
prior to the adoption and after a period of implementation of legislation for the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific,
literary or artistic productions.”); WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH,
INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 10
(2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/
ENPublicHealthReport.pdf (“Health policies, as well as inter alia those addressing
trade, the environment and commerce, should be equally subject to assessments as
to their impact on the right to health.”).
158. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 128, at 6.
159. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.629.
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panel made equal demands for substantive evidence—this time from
China. Although China’s efforts to ban immoral and politicallysensitive works are well-known and have been widely documented,
the panel refused to take “judicial notice” of censorship in China.160
Instead, the panel expected China to substantiate its assertion that
rights holders will obtain greater protection through censorship
regulations than copyright law—just like its later demand for
evidence from the United States concerning the criminal threshold
claim.161
Likewise, the panel demanded substantive evidence when China
defended its criminal thresholds by pointing out that Chinese
criminal law allows for private prosecution.162 As China claimed,
“defining a crime with too low a threshold ‘could unleash a large
volume of private enforcement actions and impose a significant
burden on the judicial system.’”163 Although the panel did not reject
China’s concern outright, it pointed out China’s failure to
substantiate such a concern. As the panel maintained, China “lacked
any data relevant to its experience after it lowered thresholds for the
crimes infringing intellectual property crimes in 2004.”164 Without
the needed substantive evidence, the panel did not consider China’s
claim further.
In the intellectual property context, the panel’s emphasis on
authoritative substantive evidence is highly important. To date, much
of the data used in media and government reports is supplied by self160. The panel’s approach contrasts strongly with the preference of some U.S.
policymakers. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported
Counterfeit Goods: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n,
109th Cong. 73 (2006) (remarks of Commissioner Patrick Mulloy) (“Maybe [the
United States] could ask the court at the WTO to take judicial notice because
sometimes you can ask a court to do that, and based on what the WTO itself has
said about China, I don’t understand why there is this enormous rock to lift up this
hill when everybody knows and will say it’s going on.”).
161. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.137 (“China
maintains that public censorship renders private enforcement unnecessary, that it
enforces prohibitions on content seriously, and that this removes banned content
from the public domain more securely than would be possible through copyright
enforcement. The Panel notes that these assertions, even if they were relevant, are
not substantiated.” (footnote omitted)).
162. See id. ¶ 7.598 (quoting China’s first written submission).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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interested trade groups.165 They are highly suspect, and
policymakers, commentators, and academics have widely questioned
their accuracy. Consider, for example, the figures supplied by the
Business Software Alliance (“BSA”) in its effort to document global
piracy rates.166 A draft Australian government report described these
statistics “as a ‘self-serving hyperbole’ [that is] ‘unverified and
epistemologically unreliable.’”167 Likewise, Gary Shapiro, the
president of the Consumer Electronics Association, called these
figures “absurd on [their] face” and “patently obscene.”168 Ivan Png
further demonstrated that the BSA’s change of consultants had led to
a change in methodology for measurement, which in turn resulted in
systematic effects on published piracy rates.169 Among the widely
criticized flaws of the BSA studies are the highly incredulous one-toone substitution rate between legal and infringing goods,170 the
overvaluation of pirated and counterfeit goods,171 and the failure to
recognize the existence of a wide variety of offsetting welfare
benefits.172
165. The lack of independently verified evidence is due in part to the practical
challenges to collecting data about illicit activities. See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 68 (1990); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
GAO-10-423,
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY:
OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 16–17 (2010) [hereinafter GAO STUDY].
166. See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE & INT’L DATA CORP., SEVENTH ANNUAL
BSA/IDC GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY (2010) available at
http://portal.bsa.org/globalpiracy2009/studies/09_Piracy_Study_Report_A4_final_
111010.pdf.
167. Li, supra note 118, at 25.
168. Software Piracy: BSA or Just BS?, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 93.
169. See I.P.L. Png, On the Reliability of Software Piracy Statistics, 9 ELEC.
COM. RES. & APPLICATIONS 365, 365 (2010).
170. See GAO STUDY, supra note 165, at 17. As Carsten Fink observed in an
issue paper he wrote before joining WIPO as its first-ever chief economist:
[BSA’s assumption] that, in the absence of piracy, all consumers of pirated software
would switch to legitimate copies at their current prices . . . is unrealistic—especially
in developing countries where low incomes would likely imply that many consumers
would not demand any legitimate software at all. Accordingly, estimated revenue
losses by software producers are bound to be overestimated.

Fink, supra note 125, at 13.
171. See GAO STUDY, supra note 165, at 17–18.
172. As the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) pointed out in its
recent study, although piracy and counterfeiting may affect the core intellectual
property industries, these industries, along with those in other sectors and
individual consumers, may have obtained offsetting benefits. Id. at 15. As stated in
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To be certain, substantive evidence is costly to collect. The
demand for such evidence, therefore, can make it difficult for less
developed countries to bring forth WTO claims. Nevertheless,
because less developed countries, until recently, have always
participated in the dispute settlement process as respondents,173 the
DSB’s demand for the production of substantive evidence on local
conditions actually may favor less developed countries more than it
harms them.

F. HOPE AND ENCOURAGEMENT
The present panel report gives hope and encouragement to less
developed countries, which have become more frequent users of the
WTO dispute settlement process in recent years.174 It is important to
the study:
[C]onsumers may use pirated goods to “sample” music, movies, software, or electronic
games before purchasing legitimate copies, which may lead to increased sales of
legitimate goods. In addition, industries with products that are characterized by large
“switching costs,” may also benefit from piracy due to lock-in effects. . . . [Moreover,]
companies that experience revenue losses in one line of business—such as movies—
may . . . increase revenues in related or complementary businesses due to increased
brand awareness. For instance, companies may experience increased revenues due to
the sales of merchandise that are based on movie characters whose popularity is
enhanced by sales of pirated movies. One expert also observed that some industries
may experience an increase in demand for their products because of piracy in other
industries. This expert identified Internet infrastructure manufacturers (e.g., companies
that make routers) as possible beneficiaries of digital piracy, because of the bandwidth
demands related to the transfer of pirated digital content. While competitive pressure
to keep one step ahead of counterfeiters may spur innovation in some cases, some of
this innovation may be oriented toward anticounterfeiting and antipiracy efforts, rather
than enhancing the product for consumers.

Id. Although the GAO study did not go further, one could easily question how
much of the losses the intellectual property industries claimed to have suffered
would be cancelled out by these benefits. If the benefits indeed outweigh the
claimed losses, the country will have a net economic gain even though the core
intellectual property industries may have suffered losses.
173. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting
Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 941 fig. 2
(2006).
174. See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten
Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 24 (2005) (noting that “the US and the EC no longer
were as dominant as complainants in the system” and that “developing country use
of the system increased dramatically” in the second half of the first decade of
operation of the WTO dispute settlement process); see also David Evans &
Gregory C. Shaffer, Introduction to DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO: THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 1, 2 (Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo
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remember that China—Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights is only the second
TRIPS-related dispute involving a developing country that focuses
primarily on the TRIPS Agreement and results in the release of a
WTO panel report.175 In the first dispute, the United States and later
the European Communities successfully challenged, through parallel
proceedings, India’s failure to establish a mailbox system in its
patent law pursuant to Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement.176 The
result was a clear-cut victory for the United States and the European
Communities.
In this second dispute, however, the result was mixed. Even in an
area where developed countries have historically dominated—
intellectual property protection and enforcement—developing
countries are now doing much better in the WTO dispute settlement
process than they did in the early days of the TRIPS Agreement. The
benefits of this process, indeed, have begun to trickle down to less
developed countries.
Most recently, India and Brazil filed complaints against the
European Union and the Netherlands over the repeated seizure of intransit generic drugs.177 Although it remains to be seen whether either
Meléndez-Ortiz eds., 2010) (observing that “no African country has ever initiated a
[WTO] dispute” and that “only one Least Developed Country . . . initiated a
dispute, and that dispute did not progress beyond the consultation phase
(Bangladesh)”).
175. The U.S.-China dispute is actually the third one involving the TRIPS
Agreement. Articles 3, 20 and 65 were implicated in Indonesia—Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile Industry. See Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile Industry pt. XI, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R,
WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998). That dispute, however, did not focus primarily on the
TRIPS Agreement. Rather, it also covered GATT, the Agreement on TradeRelated Investment Measures, and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. Out of all the complainants, only the United States claimed that
Indonesia had violated the TRIPS Agreement. See Request for Consultations by
the United States, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,
WT/DS59/1 (Oct. 15, 1996).
176. See Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); Panel Report,
India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998).
177. See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member
State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010)
[hereinafter Request for Consultations by India]; see Request for Consultations by
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of these two countries will become the first developing countries to
have a complaint resulting in the establishment of a WTO panel, the
European Union’s recent agreement with India178 to amend its
regulation on customs border measures179 already suggests the
growing ability of less developed countries to take advantage of the
WTO dispute settlement process. Moreover, even if India ultimately
settles with the European Union, the dispute between the Brazil and
the European Union could still remain.

III. DISAPPOINTMENTS
Notwithstanding the many important points scored by less
developed countries in the panel’s interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement, the panel report provides these countries with some
disappointments. For illustration purposes, this Part focuses on the
interpretation of four TRIPS provisions that are of particular
importance to less developed countries: (1) Article 1.1; (2) Articles 7
and 8; and (3) Article 41.5. All of these provisions memorialize the
hard-fought bargains less developed countries have won through the
TRIPS negotiations.180 This Part begins by discussing the panel
report’s biggest disappointment: the lack of discussion of Articles 7
and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. It then examines the WTO panel’s
treatment of Articles 1.1 and 41.5.

A. ARTICLES 7 AND 8
The biggest disappointment in the panel report concerns its failure
to discuss Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 7, which

Brazil, European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in
Transit, WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by
Brazil].
178. See India-EU Generic Drug Row ‘Resolved’ at Brussels Summit, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11971568.
179. See Council Regulation 1383/2003, Concerning Customs Actions Against
Goods Suspected of Infringing Certain Intellectual Property Rights, 2003 O.J. (L
196) 7 (EC).
180. See Gervais, supra note 120, at 30 (“The only true measures they obtained
(in addition to articles 7 and 8) were transitional periods to implement the
Agreement.”); Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS
Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1023 (2009) (stating that articles 7 and 8 are
“the very few provisions” taken from the B text advanced by less developed
countries).
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delineates the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement, provides:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.181

Article 8, which sets forth the normative principles, provides:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations,
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development, provided that such measures
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology.182

Although some commentators have considered Article 7 as “mere
hortatory”183 and highlighted the limitations of Article 8—especially
its TRIPS-consistency test184—these provisions are paramount to the
181. TRIPS Agreement art. 7.
182. Id. art. 8.
183. See CORREA, supra note 114, at 93 (“Some observers have read ‘should’ to
mean that Article 7 is a mere hortary [sic] provision, the interpretative value of
which is equivalent to that of any preambular provision.”); JACQUES J. GORLIN, AN
ANALYSIS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL-RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE WTO TRIPS
(INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY) AGREEMENT 16 (1999) (stating that “according to
United States and EC negotiators, the language of Article 7 is hortatory and does
not have any operational significance” and that Article 8 “was viewed by
developed country negotiators throughout most of the negotiations as being nonoperational and hortatory” (citing interviews with Mike Kirk and Peter Carl));
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2821, 2843 (2006) (“The language referencing development in TRIPS is
not mandatory, but rather hortatory . . . .”).
184. As Daniel Gervais noted:
Both [Paragraphs of Article 8] are limited by the use of the phrase “consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement” . . . . Given the phrase added by negotiators, it would be
difficult to justify an exception not foreseen under the Agreement, unless it is an
exception to a right not protected under other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement or
those of other international instruments incorporated in TRIPS.

GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 121–22. See generally Yu, supra note 180, at 1008–
18 (discussing Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement).
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correct interpretation of the Agreement. Article 31.1 of the Vienna
Convention states specifically that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty . . . in the light of its object and purpose.”185
Because Articles 7 and 8 were included in the text of the TRIPS
Agreement, they should be given greater weight than the preambular
provisions discussed in Part II.B. Notably, the Doha Ministerial
Declaration has singled out these two provisions for their special
importance.186 It stated explicitly that the work of the TRIPS Council
“shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in articles 7
and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully into account the
development dimension.”187
Since the entering into effect of the TRIPS Agreement,
commentators have noted the importance of Articles 7 and 8 of the
TRIPS Agreement and how these development-friendly safeguard
provisions can be interpreted to strengthen the position of less
developed countries. For example, Jerome Reichman observed:
[Developing] countries could attempt to trigger the safeguards implicit in
Articles 7 and 8 in one of two ways. The least destructive approach would
be to convince the Council for TRIPS itself to recommend narrowly
described waivers to meet specified circumstances for a limited period of
time. This approach would strengthen the mediatory powers of the
Council for TRIPS and help to offset the problems arising from the
inability of that body to quash or stay requests for consultations and
dispute-settlement panels launched by trigger-happy governments.
Alternatively, developing country defendants responding to complaints
of nullification and impairment under Article 64 might invoke the
application of Articles 7 and 8(1) to meet unforeseen conditions of
hardship. This defense, if properly grounded and supported by factual
evidence, could persuade the Appellate Body either to admit the existence
of a tacit doctrine of frustration built into the aforementioned articles or to
buttress those articles by reaching out to the general doctrine of frustration
recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Either way,
overly aggressive complainants could wind up with what would amount

185. Vienna Convention, supra note 115, art. 31.1 (emphasis added).
186. See GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 211 (noting that Articles 7 and 8 “were
singled out as having a special importance in para. 19 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration”).
187. Doha Declaration, supra note 95, ¶ 19.
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to a judicially imposed waiver.188

In the copyright context, Ruth Okediji described how Articles 7 and
8 can be used to justify the validity of the fair use privilege under the
TRIPS Agreement.189 Srividhya Ragavan also explored the use of the
provisions to determine whether a member state has provided an
effective sui generis system to protect plant varieties.190
In a recent article, I further discussed the five different ways of
using Articles 7 and 8 to facilitate a more flexible interpretation and
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement:
(1) as a guiding light for interpretation and implementation; (2) as a shield
against aggressive demands for increased intellectual property protection;
(3) as a sword to challenge provisions that overprotect intellectual
property rights or tolerate their abuse; (4) as a bridge to connect the
TRIPS regime with other intellectual property or related international
regimes; and (5) as a seed for the development of new international
intellectual property norms.191

Although WTO panel reports have applied Articles 7 and 8 on
occasion, their application has remained limited, and the two
provisions deserve greater attention from both the DSB and members
participating in the WTO dispute settlement process. After all, these
two provisions can influence the development of the international
intellectual property regime in many different ways:
Legally, the two provisions play important roles in the interpretation and
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. Economically, they facilitate
innovation, technology transfer, and knowledge production while at the
same time promoting social and economic welfare and development
goals. Politically, they provide the much-needed balance to make the
Agreement a legitimate bargain between developed and less-developed

188. J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or
Cooperation with the Developing Countries, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441,
461–62 (2000).
189. See Okediji, supra note 107, at 167–68. But see GERVAIS, supra note 111,
at 207 (stating that “it is unclear whether art.7 could be used to ‘stretch’ art.13 (or
other ‘exceptions’ articles) as much as would be necessary to cover certain forms
of fair use, including reverse engineering (decompilation) and parody”).
190. See Srividhya Ragavan & Jamie Mayer O’Shields, Has India Addressed Its
Farmers’ Woes? A Story of Plant Protection Issues, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
97, 101 (2007).
191. Yu, supra note 180, at 982.
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countries. Structurally, the two provisions bridge the gap between the
TRIPS regime and other international regimes. Globally, they have sowed
the seeds for the development of new international norms both within and
without the TRIPS regime.192

Notwithstanding the importance of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement and the Vienna Convention’s explicit stipulation that a
treaty be interpreted in good faith “in the light of its object and
purpose,”193 the WTO panel in the U.S.-China dispute did not
mention Article 7 or 8 even once. Nor did it mention anything about
the objectives or the principles of the TRIPS Agreement.
The panel’s approach contrasts significantly with that of Canada—
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products.194 In that dispute, the
European Communities challenged the regulatory review and
stockpiling exceptions in Canadian patent law as violative of the
TRIPS Agreement. In response, Canada drew attention to Articles 7
and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and contended that these provisions
“call for a liberal interpretation of the three conditions stated in
Article 30 of the Agreement, so that governments would have the
necessary flexibility to adjust patent rights to maintain the desired
balance with other important national policies.”195 As the WTO panel
recounted:
In the view of Canada, [the clause “in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations” in] Article
7 . . . declares that one of the key goals of the TRIPS Agreement was a
balance between the intellectual property rights created by the Agreement
and other important socio-economic policies of WTO Member
governments. Article 8 elaborates the socio-economic policies in
question, with particular attention to health and nutritional policies.196

Although the European Communities “did not dispute the stated
goal of achieving a balance within the intellectual property rights
system between important national policies,”197 it took a very

192. Id. at 1046.
193. Vienna Convention, supra note 115, art. 31.1.
194. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
195. Id. ¶ 7.24.
196. Id.
197. Id. ¶ 7.25.
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different view of Articles 7 and 8. As the Panel continued:
In the view of the EC, Articles 7 and 8 are statements that describe the
balancing of goals that had already taken place in negotiating the final
texts of the TRIPS Agreement. According to the EC, to view Article 30 as
an authorization for governments to “renegotiate” the overall balance of
the Agreement would involve a double counting of such socio-economic
policies. In particular, the EC pointed to the last phrase of Article 8.1
requiring that government measures to protect important socio-economic
policies be consistent with the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement. The
EC also referred to the provisions of first consideration of the Preamble
and Article 1.1 as demonstrating that the basic purpose of the TRIPS
Agreement was to lay down minimum requirements for the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights.198

In the end, the Panel found Canada’s position a little more
convincing, and struck a compromise between the two positions by
allowing for “certain adjustments” that stopped short of renegotiating
the basic balance of the TRIPS Agreement. As the panel declared:
Article 30’s very existence amounts to a recognition that the definition of
patent rights contained in Article 28 would need certain adjustments. On
the other hand, the three limiting conditions attached to Article 30 testify
strongly that the negotiators of the Agreement did not intend Article 30 to
bring about what would be equivalent to a renegotiation of the basic
balance of the Agreement. Obviously, the exact scope of Article 30’s
authority will depend on the specific meaning given to its limiting
conditions. The words of those conditions must be examined with
particular care on this point. Both the goals and the limitations stated in
Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in mind when doing so as well
as those of other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which indicate its
object and purposes.199

Although the panel underscored the need to take account of the goals
and the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1, it “avoided
elaboration of the content and implications of [these provisions],
despite the specific reference that the parties made thereto in their
submissions.”200
Since Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
the DSB—whether through the Appellate Body or a WTO panel—
198. Id.
199. Id. ¶ 7.26.
200. CORREA, supra note 114, at 102.
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has not provided any further interpretation and application of
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.201 In Canada—Term of
Patent Protection, the Appellate Body explicitly acknowledged that
the DSB had yet to determine “the applicability of Article 7 or
Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement in possible future cases with
respect to measures to promote the policy objectives of the WTO
Members that are set out in those Articles.”202 In its view, the two
provisions “still await appropriate interpretation.”203
In light of the provisions’ strong potential, yet limited
development, the lack of discussion of Articles 7 and 8 in China—
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights is therefore rather disappointing. This panel report
could have been an ideal dispute for the DSB to elaborate on the
content, meaning, and implications of Articles 7 and 8—two
provisions that are likely to provide important safeguards for less
developed countries in the WTO framework. To a great extent, these
countries missed a rare opportunity to establish further a prodevelopment interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.
In all fairness to the WTO panel, none of the parties—be it China,
the United States, or any of the twelve third parties—mentioned
Articles 7 and 8 in its submissions. Given the design and structure of
the WTO dispute settlement process, the WTO panel is unlikely to
include in its report an argument not raised by any of the parties. The
lost opportunity, therefore, can be somewhat attributed to both China
and the developing country third parties. The positions taken by
these countries contrast significantly with the position India recently
took in European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic
Drugs in Transit.204 In its complaint, India reminded the DSB that
“the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement referred to above must be
interpreted and implemented in light of the objectives and principles

201. See Denis Borges Barbosa et al., Slouching Towards Development in
International Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 98 (“The balancing
role of articles 7 and 8 has not received full support in the WTO case law. The
WTO Appellate Body analysis in . . . Canada—Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products . . . is not definitive . . . .”).
202. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Term of Patent Protection, ¶ 101,
WT/DS170/AB/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
203. Id.
204. See Request for Consultations by India, supra note 177, at 3.
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set forth in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.”205
In sum, the lack of discussion of Articles 7 and 8 in the present
panel report provides an important lesson for all less developed
countries. If these two provisions are to provide the key basis for a
pro-development interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, they need
to be utilized to the fullest extent in the WTO submissions to help
develop or clarify their normative content. By further developing
Articles 7 and 8, countries can also “pave[] the way for the
development of future exceptions and limitations, which can be used
to restore the balance of the international intellectual property
system.”206 The greater use of the two provisions may even help
“persuade the [DSB] to recognize and give effect to developmental
priorities.”207

B. ARTICLE 1.1
The third sentence of Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement
provides: “Members shall be free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within
their own legal system and practice.”208 It echoes the Agreement’s
preamble, which recognizes “the special needs of the least-developed
country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to
create a sound and viable technological base.”209
Notably, the third sentence of Article 1.1 did not come from the
developed countries’ original proposal. As Professor Gervais
recounted:
[W]hile, in their draft texts, the EC and the United States had suggested a

205. Id. Notably, Brazil did not mention in its complaint Articles 7 and 8 of the
TRIPS Agreement. See Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 177.
206. Yu, supra note 180, at 1007; accord J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to
Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 11, 35 (1997) (stating that the safeguard provisions implicit in the
objectives set out in Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement and the public interest
exceptions expressly recognized in Article 8 “may legitimize ad hoc exceptions
and limitations required by overriding national development needs or for reasons
of national health, welfare or security”).
207. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 109, at 130.
208. TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1.
209. Id. pmbl.
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provision according to which countries would “provide for the protection
of intellectual property rights under their domestic law and practice in
accordance with [the provision of TRIPS]”, the final text uses similar
words to recognise the flexibility of countries implementing TRIPS vis-àvis their legal systems and practices.210

Instead, the sentence reflects in part the fairly detailed intervention
India made during the July 1989 meeting of the TRIPS Negotiating
Group, as well as the expectation of many less developed
countries.211 As the GATT Secretariat recounted:
[The Indian delegate] emphasised that any discussion on the intellectual
property system should keep in perspective that the essence of the system
was its monopolistic and restrictive character. This had special
implications for developing countries, because more than 99 per cent of
the world’s stock of patents was owned by the nationals of the
industrialised countries. Recognising the extraordinary rights granted by
the system and their implications, international conventions on this
subject incorporated, as a central philosophy, the freedom of member
States to attune their intellectual property protection system to their own
needs and conditions. This freedom of host countries should be
recognised as a fundamental principle and should guide all of the
discussions in the Negotiating Group.212

It is, therefore, no surprise that China described Article 1.1, along
with Article 41.5, as a “key concession[] to the developing world.”213
In the present dispute, China invoked Article 1.1 in its response to
the United States’ complaint over China’s use of criminal thresholds.
As China claimed, this provision laid down “a specific ‘caveat’ that
establishes boundaries on obligations, specifically in the realm of
enforcement.”214 The provision not only provided the much-needed

210. GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 164.
211. See Yu, supra note 180, at 987–89 (discussing India’s intervention).
212. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Note by the Secretariat: Meeting of
Negotiating Group of 12–14 July 1989, ¶ 5, MTN.GNG/NG11/14 (Sept. 12, 1989)
(emphasis added).
213. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, Annex B–4, ¶ 33
(“Articles 1.1 and 41.5 were key concessions to the developing world, which the
United States and other developed third parties seek now to dismiss and
disregard.”).
214. Id. ¶ 7.511.
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context for interpreting the TRIPS Agreement,215 but also indicated
that “the balance of rights and obligations in TRIPS is . . . very much
at stake in this dispute.”216
After careful review, however, the WTO panel rejected China’s
position. As it declared, Article 1.1 “does not permit differences in
domestic legal systems and practices to justify any derogation from
the basic obligation to give effect to the provisions on
enforcement.”217 Instead of allowing a member state to lower the
specified TRIPS standards, the provision merely grants to a WTO
member “freedom to determine the appropriate method of
implementation of the provisions to which they are required to give
effect.”218
Although the panel’s interpretation of Article 1.1 was
disappointing for many less developed countries, such interpretation
was consistent with that found in the reports of the Appellate Body
or other WTO panels. In all of these reports, no respondent has ever
succeeded in using the third sentence of Article 1.1 to defend its
measures against non-compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. In
India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, for example, India was found to have violated
Articles 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement despite mounting a
defense based in part on Article 1.1.219 Although the Appellate Body
was reluctant to “second guess national governments and decide
what is appropriate within a particular legal ‘system and practice,’”220
it refused to allow India to determine by itself whether the country’s
implementation was consistent with the WTO. As the Appellate
Body explained:
215. See id.; see also id. Annex B–2, ¶ 15 (“During the Uruguay Round
negotiations, developing countries objected strenuously to new enforcement
obligations that would prescribe rigid standards and would ignore principles of
sovereignty. Developing countries prevailed, over opposition from the United
States and others, on the inclusion of both Article 1.1 and Article 41.5.”).
216. Id. Annex B–2, ¶ 2.
217. Id. ¶ 7.513.
218. Id.
219. Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); Panel Report,
India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998).
220. CORREA, supra note 114, at 28.

2011]

TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

775

[T]he Panel was simply performing its task in determining whether
India’s “administrative instructions” for receiving mailbox applications
were in conformity with India’s obligations under Article 70.8(a) of the
TRIPS Agreement. It is clear that an examination of the relevant aspects
of Indian municipal law and, in particular, the relevant provisions of the
Patents Act as they relate to the “administrative instructions”, is essential
to determining whether India has complied with its obligations under
Article 70.8(a). There was simply no way for the Panel to make this
determination without engaging in an examination of Indian law. But . . .
the Panel was not interpreting Indian law “as such”; rather, the Panel was
examining Indian law solely for the purpose of determining whether India
had met its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. To say that the Panel
should have done otherwise would be to say that only India can assess
whether Indian law is consistent with India’s obligations under the WTO
Agreement. This, clearly, cannot be so.221

Thus, even with the safeguard created by the third sentence of Article
1.1, the Appellate Body made it clear that “[t]he freedom preserved
by [the provision] cannot be seen . . . as a blank cheque for Members
to decide by themselves whether they have complied or not with
their obligations.”222 Instead, the legislation of each member state is
subject to review by the DSB.
Likewise, in United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright
Act, where the United States asserted Article 1.1 as part of its
defense, the panel declared that “while the WTO Members are free to
choose the method of implementation, the minimum standards of
protection are the same for all of them.”223 That dispute concerned
the European Communities’ challenge of Section 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act, which enables some restaurants and small
establishments to play copyrighted music without compensating
copyright holders.224 Although the United States defended that the
221. Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶ 66, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
222. CORREA, supra note 114, at 28; accord UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 109,
at 28 (“[The] freedom to determine appropriate method is not the equivalent of a
right to self-certify compliance with TRIPS obligations. Compliance requires
demonstration of a legally sound basis of implementation.”).
223. Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
¶ 6.189, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Section 110(5) Panel Report].
224. For discussions of the dispute, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The
Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of
Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001); Laurence R. Helfer, World Music on
a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music
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exemptions were valid under the three-step test as laid out in Article
13 of the TRIPS Agreement, the panel found the business exemption
within the provision inconsistent with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and
11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention as incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement.225
In the end, an arbitration proceeding determined that the United
States owed the complainant an annual compensation of
€1,219,900.226 While the United States paid the European Union $3.3
million more than a year later,227 it disappointingly had neither
updated its statute to ensure compliance with the TRIPS Agreement
nor made a second payment. To date, this dispute remains one of the
two cases involving the TRIPS Agreement where the respondent
remains in noncompliance with the panel report.228
Given the dismal track record in using the third sentence of Article
1.1, it is fair to assume that its future use is unlikely to provide any
effective defense against TRIPS noncompliance, even though WTO
members may still be tempted to include such a sentence in their oral
statements or written submissions. To a great extent, the WTO
members’ duty to interpret international agreements in good faith
(pacta sunt servanda) has largely constrained the interpretation of
the third sentence of Article 1.1.229 The sentence’s limited effect is
similar to that of the first sentence of Article 1.1, which requires
WTO members to “give effect to the provisions of this
Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000).
225. See Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 223, ¶ 7.1.
226. See Award of the Arbitrators, United States—Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act: Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, ¶ 5.1,
WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001).
227. See Yu, supra note 173, at 940 n.196.
228. See Pauwelyn, supra note 39, at 417. The other dispute involving a
noncompliant respondent is also one where the United States served as the
respondent. United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998
involved the prohibition of registration or renewal of trademarks previously
abandoned by trademark holders whose business and assets have been confiscated
under Cuban law. See Section 211 Panel Report, supra note 6.
229. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 109, at 26 (“There are limits to TRIPS
Agreement flexibility in the sense that its rules cannot be stretched beyond
reasonable good faith interpretation.”); see also Vienna Convention, supra note
115, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 321 (1987) (“[E]very international agreement in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”).
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Agreement.”230 Apart from the fact that the two sentences cancel
each other out, neither provision adds anything substantive to the
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement—other than what public
international law already provides.
Disturbingly, the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) recently
suggested that similar language in ACTA might provide the country
with an escape route to avoid conflicts between ACTA and domestic
U.S. law.231 The USTR’s position was troubling. By directly
contradicting in the ACTA context the position it took in China—
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, the position signaled disturbing inconsistency, if not
outright hypocrisy.
Even worse, if other countries shared the USTR’s position with
respect to ACTA and applied it to the TRIPS Agreement, one has to
wonder whether the TRIPS Agreement will still offer any
meaningful protection to intellectual property rights holders. In a
way, Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement will become a major
loophole that justifies virtually all forms of noncompliance with the
TRIPS Agreement.
Thus, by making a creative interpretation of the TRIPS language
used in ACTA to defray criticisms of the unnecessarily secretive
negotiations and the lack of public consultation, the USTR
unintentionally harmed its own position vis-à-vis other WTO
members. This impact, to some extent, is similar to the unanticipated
damage caused by the United States’ short-sighted exploration of
compulsory licensing as an option to lower the price of ciprofloxacin
following anthrax attacks in 2001.232 Such exploration not only
230. TRIPS Agreement art. 1.
231. See James Love, USTR’s Implausible Claim that ACTA Article 1.2 Is an All
Purpose Loophole, and the Ramifications if True, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L
(Oct. 22, 2010, 02:23PM), http://keionline.org/node/990; Mike Masnick, US
Basically Says It’ll Ignore Anything in ACTA that It Doesn’t Like . . . So How
About Everyone Else?, TECHDIRT (Oct. 25, 2010, 06:34AM), http://www.tech
dirt.com/articles/20101025/01382311559/us-basically-says-it-ll-ignore-anythingin-acta-that-it-doesn-t-like-so-how-about-everyone-else.shtml.
232. See Debora Halbert, Moralized Discourses: South Africa’s Intellectual
Property Fight for Access to AIDS Drugs, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 257, 280 (2002)
(“The U.S. lost significant international legitimacy when the overwhelming
hypocrisy of its own efforts regarding anthrax were juxtaposed against the efforts
of developing countries to secure cheap access to AIDS drugs.”); Susan K. Sell,
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suggested a double standard, but has also greatly undermined the
country’s ability to convince its trading partners to refrain from using
compulsory licensing to meet public health needs.

C. ARTICLE 41.5
Article 41.5 of the TRIPS Agreement states that “[n]othing in
[Part III of the Agreement] creates any obligation with respect to the
distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual
property rights and the enforcement of law in general.”233 This
provision states explicitly that a WTO member is not required to
devote more resources to intellectual property enforcement than to
other areas of law enforcement. It further invites the DSB to evaluate
whether the resource demands for intellectual property enforcement
are disproportional to demands in other areas.234
The provision is particularly important to less developed countries.
During the TRIPS negotiations, these countries were deeply
concerned about the need to reallocate a considerable amount of
resources to set up specialized intellectual property courts or
strengthen intellectual property enforcement.235 These concerns were
TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 481, 515–16
(2002) (noting that the series of events surrounding the United States’ response to
high drug prices during the anthrax attacks “caught the attention of the access
campaign and developing country negotiators, and was on everybody’s minds at
Doha”); Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 43 (2002)
(“The anthrax scare and the threatened shortage of Cipro forced all WTO Members
to ask how much of a prisoner they want to be of their own patent systems.”); José
Marcos Nogueira Viana, Intellectual Property Rights, the World Trade
Organization and Public Health: The Brazilian Perspective, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L.
311, 313 (2002) (“U.S. and Canadian approaches to the anthrax scare is precisely
what the Brazilian government has been doing over the past two years in response
to HIV/AIDS.”); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J.
827, 874 n.247 (2007) (discussing how the United States’ proposal can be
distinguished from the request for compulsory licensing by less developed
countries).
233. TRIPS Agreement art. 41.5.
234. See Jayashree Watal, US–China Intellectual Property Dispute—A Comment
on the Interpretation of the TRIPS Enforcement Provisions, 13 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 605, 610–11 (2010) (noting that countries “could use the last sentence in
article 41.5 as a defence against the disproportionate deployment of resources
needed to implement these standards or, as was the case in this dispute, to pursue
criminal prosecutions in IP infringement cases”).
235. See GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 440 (“The two principal stumbling blocks
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so severe that less developed countries specifically demanded the
inclusion of Article 41.5 in the TRIPS Agreement. As Professor
Correa recounted:
The last paragraph of Article 41 was not suggested in the original U.S.
and EC proposals. It was included in order to address the concerns of
developing countries, based on a proposal by the Indian delegation. This
was in fact one of the few provisions in Part III where developing
countries’ views made a difference.236

As far as the present dispute is concerned, Article 41.5 is of
additional significance to China and thereby provides an instructive
lesson for other less developed countries. In retrospect, the existence
of the provision partly explains the United States’ reluctance to file a
WTO complaint against China over a lack of enforcement of
intellectual property rights based on a general impression, as
compared to noncompliance based on the violation of specific TRIPS
provisions.237 After all, if China is able to show that its resource
demands in the area of intellectual property enforcement have far
exceeded those in other areas of law enforcement, China is likely to
prevail.
In the end, the United States filed an “as such” complaint,238 which
during the TRIPS discussions were the ironing out of differences amongst legal
systems and the need to take account of many developing countries’ availability of
resources.”).
236. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 109, at 585.
237. See Yu, supra note 173, at 935.
238. As the Appellate Body declared in United States—Sunset Review of AntiDumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan:
When a measure is challenged ‘as such’, the starting point for an analysis must be the
measure on its face. If the meaning and content of the measure are clear on its face,
then the consistency of the measure as such can be assessed on that basis alone. If,
however, the meaning or content of the measure is not evident on its face, further
examination is required.

Appellate Body Report, United States—Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, ¶
168 (Dec. 15, 2003). But see Gervais, supra note 31, at 549 (noting that the WTO
panel’s analysis may have “blurred both the traditional distinction between ‘as
such’ and ‘as applied’ claims and the line separating TRIPS violations from nonviolations”); Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential
Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1023, 1059 (2009) (“Given
the lack of detail in the enforcement provisions the US argument was really more
of a non-violation complaint. The essence of what the USA was really complaining
about was that a benefit it expected from the TRIPS Agreement was better levels
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took away China’s potential defense under Article 41.5.
Notwithstanding the United States’ preemptory tactics, China still
advanced arguments based on Article 41.5 in response to the U.S.
charge that its criminal thresholds failed to comply with the TRIPS
Agreement. As it contended, the provision, along with Article 1.1,
provided the much-needed context for interpreting the TRIPS
Agreement.239 Although the panel ultimately rejected China’s
arguments based on either provision, it acknowledged that “Article
41.5 is an important provision in the overall balance of rights and
obligations in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement.”240 It also treated
Article 41.5 somewhat differently from Article 1.1. Instead of
declaring that Article 41.5 does not permit the use of resource
constraints “to justify any derogation from the basic obligation to
give effect to the provisions on enforcement”—the wording used in
Article 1.1241—the panel merely noted China’s failure to substantiate
how the lack of thresholds would have overburdened its criminal law
system.242 Implicitly, the panel recognized the possibility of using
resource constraints to justify derogations from TRIPS enforcement
obligations.
In a way, the present panel report suggested that a future WTO
panel could consider the shift of burdens, responsibilities, and risks
of enforcement from private rights holders to national governments,
especially those in the less developed world. In the report’s closing
paragraph, the panel also noted clearly that its task was not “to
review the desirability of strict IPR enforcement.”243 After all, the
second sentence of Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement gives
member states the power to “implement in their law more extensive
protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.”244
of enforcement.”).
239. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.481.
240. Id. ¶ 7.594.
241. Cf. id. ¶ 7.513.
242. See id. ¶ 7.598; see also GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 442 (“[T]he
restriction [in Article 41.5] would not apply where no demonstrable increase in
resources is needed to implement an obligation contained in the Agreement. Nor
does it allow the maintenance of any system or tradition, other than when
availability of resources is at play.”).
243. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 8.5.
244. TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1 (emphasis added).
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Thus, one could argue that, through this carefully worded report, the
panel has sent some subtle warning signals to developed countries,
which, despite the compromise made at the TRIPS negotiations,
continue to aggressively push for TRIPS-plus enforcement norms to
the detriment of less developed countries.

CONCLUSION
In China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO panel, for the first time,
focused its report primarily on the interpretation and implementation
of the TRIPS enforcement provisions. The report not only provides
certainty and clarity to a WTO member’s TRIPS enforcement
obligations, but also enables the United States to receive redress of
some of its complaints over inadequate intellectual property
protection and enforcement in China.
More importantly from the standpoint of less developed countries,
the panel report enables them to score some important points in the
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. For example, the report
underscores the importance of having minimum standards and
flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement and the longstanding treatment
of intellectual property rights as private rights. It also rejects the use
of bilateral, plurilateral, or regional trade agreements to divine
meaning in the TRIPS language. In addition, the report appreciates
the divergent local market conditions in each WTO member while
continuing the use of an evidence-based approach for resolving
WTO disputes. In short, the report provides considerable hope and
encouragement to less developed countries, which only recently are
beginning to make more frequent use of the WTO dispute settlement
process.
To be certain, the report includes some disappointments—most
notably in its lack of discussion of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement. Nonetheless, it leaves the door open for future efforts to
elaborate on the content, meaning, and implications of these
provisions. The panel’s discussion of Article 41.5 also suggests its
willingness to entertain greater challenges in the area so long as the
respondent produces sufficient substantive and nonanecdotal
evidence to show that the resource demands in the area of intellectual
property enforcement have far exceeded those in other areas of law
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enforcement.
Immediately after the release of the present panel report,
policymakers, industry representatives, and commentators were
quick to determine whether China or the United States has prevailed.
Whether intended or not, however, less developed countries might
have become the dispute’s ultimate winner. As an African proverb
says, when two elephants fight, the grass gets trampled. In this
dispute, the grass not only has not been trampled, but it has become
even greener than before.

